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Articles 
ENFORCING VICTIMS’ RIGHTS IN ILLINOIS:  
THE RATIONALE FOR VICTIM “STANDING” 
IN CRIMINAL PROSECUTIONS 
Lawrence Schlam* 
“It's moving from a two-ring circus to a three-ring circus that 
was never contemplated as part of the public justice 
system. . . .”1 
                                                 
* J.D., New York University. Professor of Law, Northern Illinois University College of 
Law.  The author wishes to gratefully acknowledge the encouragement and helpful 
thoughts of my colleague, Professor Marc Falkoff, and to express appreciation for the 
invaluable research assistance of Noah Menold (J.D., NIU 2014), Daniel Kalina (J.D., NIU 
2014), and Matthew Peterson (J.D., NIU 2015). 
Sadly, this Article is appearing posthumously.  Professor Lawrence 
Schlam passed away suddenly in March 2015.  Larry was an expert in 
state and federal constitutional law, as well as a founding member of 
the law school at Northern Illinois University.  Among his many 
virtues, he was a fierce advocate for the rights of victims of crime.  In a 
landmark case, he represented a stalking victim who was denied an 
opportunity to make a statement prior to the court’s acceptance of a 
plea bargain by the defendant.  See People v. Johnson, 12 CF 76 
(DeKalb Cnty., Ill. Oct. 5, 2012) (establishing that a crime victim has 
standing and may intervene in a criminal matter in order to vindicate 
statutory victim’s rights).  Not satisfied with winning his case, Larry 
used People v. Johnson as a vehicle for communicating to the legal 
community the inordinate difficulties that crime victims faced in 
having their voices heard in court.  See, e.g., Lawrence Schlam, Victim 
Participation in Criminal Proceedings Makes Good Sense, CHI. DAILY L. 
BULL., May 21, 2014, available at http://www.niu.edu/law/calendar/ 
news_items/2014/Reprint%20NIU%20Schlam%20CDLB%2014%2005
%2021a.pdf, archived at http://perma.cc/GJC5-FMDM (advocating for 
passage of a state constitutional amendment clarifying their right to 
standing).  When the Illinois Crime Victims’ Bill of Rights Amendment 
was passed by an overwhelming majority of voters on November 4, 
2014, the new constitutional provision became a part of Professor 
Schlam’s enduring legacy. 
Memorial written by Marc Falkoff, Associate Professor, Northern Illinois University 
College of Law. 
1 Josh Weinhold, Victims’ Rights Amendment Resurfaces in Legislature, CHI. DAILY L. 
BULL., Jan. 22, 2013, at 1 (quoting James R. Covington III, ISBA Director of Legislative 
Affairs).  Put another way, the complaint about standing for victims is that “victims 
contesting violations of their rights could delay or complicate criminal cases and clash with 
defendants' rights to a speedy trial.”  Id. (quoting Matthew P. Jones, Office of The Appellate 
Prosecutor, Associate Director for Administration). 
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I.  INTRODUCTION 
In 1993, after growing pressure from victim’s advocacy groups, the 
Illinois Constitution was amended to provide a substantial list of rights 
to which victims of crimes would thereafter be entitled.2  This was 
followed by legislation executing the constitutional amendment, which 
added a requirement that the State notify victims of or facilitate their 
rights.3  The enforcement of victims’ rights, therefore, was delegated 
solely to prosecutors, who could potentially—and often actually did—fail 
in their statutory duty due to inadvertent nonfeasance or overly 
conservative use of prosecutorial discretion.4  Thus, for more than 
twenty years, with at least one recorded exception, it has remained less 
than clear whether crime victims have “standing” to independently 
enforce their own rights should the statutorily mandated process fail.5  
                                                 
2 See infra Part II.B (discussing victims’ rights in Illinois). 
3 See ILL. CONST. art. I, § 8.1 (noting Article I, Section 8.1 of the Illinois Constitution is 
not self-executing).  The clause is, however, executed by the Rights of Crime Victims and 
Witnesses Act.  725 ILL. COMP. STAT. 120/4 (2010) [hereinafter “the Act”].  The Act affords 
victims of violent crime the same rights afforded by the Illinois Constitution and several 
additional rights.  Id.; see also 725 ILL. COMP. STAT. 120/4.5(b)(9) (2010) (“[The prosecutor] 
shall inform the victim of the right to have present at all court proceedings, subject to the 
rules of evidence, an advocate or other support person of the victim's choice, and the right 
to retain an attorney, at the victim's own expense, who, upon written notice filed with the 
clerk of the court and State's Attorney, is to receive copies of all notices, motions and court 
orders filed thereafter in the case, in the same manner as if the victim were a named party 
in the case[.]”).  “In Illinois, a proposed constitutional Crime Victim's Rights amendment 
was placed on the ballot . . . after approval by the House on a 1170 vote and after 
overwhelming approval by the Senate. . . .  The Illinois amendment passed with over three-
fourths voter approval.”  Jeffrey A. Parness, Laura Lee & Karen Blouin, Monetary Remedies 
for Victims During Illinois Criminal Cases, 44 VAL. U. L. REV. 69, 73–74 (2009) (citations 
omitted). 
4 725 ILL. COMP. STAT. 102/4.5(b); see ROBERT C. DAVIS ET AL., SECURING RIGHTS FOR 
VICTIMS:  A PROCESS EVALUATION OF THE NATIONAL CRIME VICTIM LAW INSTITUTE’S 
VICTIMS’ RIGHTS CLINICS 12 (2009) (finding that victims’ rights were infringed).  Despite 
passage of crime victims’ rights laws: 
[A]dvocates have been dismayed to see that, too often, victims’ rights 
were violated with impunity.  [A] survey of crime victims in 1998 
found that, even within states with strong victims’ rights legislation, 
many victims were not notified about key hearings and proceedings, 
many were not given the opportunity to be heard, and few received 
restitution. . . .  [A]s many as one-third of victims in strong-protection 
states were not afforded the opportunity to exercise certain rights. 
Id. (citations omitted). 
5 See, e.g., People v. Johnson, 12 CF 76 (DeKalb Cnty., Ill. Oct. 5, 2012) (granting 
standing and intervention in a criminal case to a victim).  In that litigation, a petitioner-
intervener alleged that she had: 
[E]xpressed to the State’s Attorney her desire to exercise her [victims’ 
rights but] no one from the [State’s] Attorney’s Office spoke to [her] 
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They continue to be without clear recourse in Illinois to the traditional 
“check” on nonfeasance or malfeasance by public officials—standing to 
seek judicial review of perceived deprivations of expressed rights.6 
Over the past two years, however, legislative and political efforts 
were made to again amend the Illinois Constitution, this time specifically 
to provide crime victims “standing”—a right to participate directly in 
criminal prosecutions to vindicate denied constitutional rights.7  An 
                                                                                                             
prior to the plea agreement . . . nor did the State inform her that the 
condition of electronic monitoring [was removed by a prior court order 
and, had the State] consulted with her prior to this date [of the prior 
court order,] she would have attended that hearing . . . and presented a 
victim impact statement that would have included, among other 
things, her desire to have the defendant continue to be placed on 
electronic monitoring. . . . 
Id.  She also alleged that “[i]ntervention is necessary because the [State’s Attorney] 
informed [her] that he will not assert her rights or seek a remedy on her behalf.”  Id.; see 
Am. Crime Victim’s Mot. to Intervene for the Ltd. Purposes of Asserting Constitutional and 
Statutory Rights of Crime Victims and Seeking Remedies for Violations of Those Rights, 
People v. Johnson, 12 CF 76 (DeKalb Cnty., Ill. Jun. 8, 2012) (on file with author). 
6 See Proposals for a Constitutional Amendment to Provide Rights for Victims of Crime:  
Hearing Before the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 104th Cong. 242 (1996) (statement of Laurence 
H. Tribe, Professor, Harvard Law School) (noting that the problem with statutory rights for 
victims is that they “provide too little real protection whenever they come into conflict with 
bureaucratic habit, traditional indifference, sheer inertia, or any mention of an accused's rights 
regardless of whether those rights are genuinely threatened.” (emphasis added)).  “Properly 
understood, crime victims' rights are not barriers to an effectively functioning criminal 
justice system, but rather an important part of such a system.  Crime victims' rights form 
part of the checks and balances that ensure a properly functioning criminal justice process.”  
Paul G. Cassell & Steven Joffee, The Crime Victim's Expanding Role in a System of Public 
Prosecution:  A Response to the Critics of the Crime Victims' Rights Act, 105 NW. U. L. REV. 
COLLOQUY 164, 181 (2011); see also Susan Bandes, Victim Standing, 1999 UTAH L. REV. 331, 
343 (1999) (“[T]he discretion given to prosecutors, thanks to a host of current doctrines, is 
virtually unlimited.  [Thus there] is room for more judicial supervision without running the 
risk of stripping prosecutors of all their discretion.” (footnotes omitted)); Mary Margaret 
Giannini, Note, The Swinging Pendulum of Victims’ Rights:  The Enforceability of Indiana’s 
Victims’ Rights Laws, 34 IND. L. REV. 1157, 1167 (2001) (“The strength of many states' victims' 
rights laws are immediately hampered by the absence of any direct method to remedy 
victims' rights violations, coupled with a lack of mandatory language to enforce those 
rights.”). 
7 See, e.g., H.R.J. Res. Constitutional Amendment 00001, 98th. Gen. Assemb. (Ill. 2014), 
available at http://www.ilga.gov/legislation/BillStatus_pf.asp?DocNum=1&DocTypeID 
=HJRCA&LegID=68225&GAID=12&SessionID=85&GA=98, archived at http://perma.cc/ 
ZD74-HN6Y [hereinafter Amendment] (proposing to amend the Illinois Constitution 
regarding victims’ rights).  According to its synopsis, the bill: 
Proposes to amend the Bill of Rights Article of the Illinois Constitution 
concerning crime victim's rights.  Provides that in addition to other 
rights provided in the Constitutional provision, a crime victim has the 
right to:  (1) be free from harassment, intimidation, and abuse; (2) 
refuse to disclose information that is privileged or confidential by law; 
(3) timely notification of all court proceedings; (4) be heard at any 
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early bill, introduced in 2012, was opposed by several interested parties, 
including the Illinois State Bar Association.8  For this, and perhaps other 
reasons, the bill did not move forward that session, but resurfaced again 
in the legislature early in 2013.9  The same interests, again, resisted 
passage of the bill and it failed to reach the ballot.10  However, a 
substantially similar bill was introduced again in March of 2014 and, 
having been overwhelmingly approved as a joint resolution on April 10, 
2014, it was ratified by the citizens of Illinois on last November’s ballot.11 
Objections to bills introduced earlier—difficulties hypothetically 
anticipated—were misguided.12  Allowing “victim standing” is already 
within the inherent power of the judiciary, and would simply be ratified 
or reaffirmed by any “victim standing” amendment.13  Moreover, the 
experience with victim standing as a matter of positive law in other 
                                                                                                             
proceeding involving a post-arraignment release decision, plea, 
sentencing, post-conviction or post-adjudication release decision, and 
any post-arraignment proceeding in which a right of the victim is at 
issue; (5) receive a report related to the defendant's sentence when 
available to the accused; and (6) have the safety of the victim and the 
victim's family considered in denying or fixing the amount of bail, 
determining whether to release the defendant, and setting conditions 
of release after arrest and conviction.  Provides that a victim, victim's 
lawyer, or the prosecuting attorney may assert the victim's constitutional 
rights in court.  Provides that nothing in this Constitutional provision 
creates any cause of action for compensation or damages against the 
State, any political subdivision of the State, any officer, employee, or 
agent of the State or of any of its political subdivisions, or any officer 
or employee of the court.  Effective upon being declared adopted. 
Id.  (emphasis added). 
8 See Chris Bonjean, ISBA Position Paper on House Joint Resolution for Constitutional 
Amendment No. 29, ILL. STATE B. ASS’N (Apr. 26, 2012), available at http://iln.isba.org/ 
blog/2012/04/26/isba-position-paper-house-joint-resolution-constitutional-amendment-
no-29, archived at http://perma.cc/84AK-DLVZ (objecting to the problems that might arise 
from adding another “party” to criminal prosecutions); see also Illinois Victims’ Rights 
Amendment Stalls After Sudden Turnaround in Legislative Support, HUFF. POST (May 7, 2012), 
available at http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2012/05/07/illinois-victims-rights-a_n_ 
1496118.html, archived at http://perma.cc/E52M-QTBL (noting that a bill amending the 
Illinois Constitution to allow victim standing has been “stalled”). 
9 See Weinhold, supra note 1, at 1. 
10 See id. (“[The] Illinois State Bar Association (ISBA), the state's attorneys appellate 
prosecutor's office and Cook County State's Attorney Anita M. Alvarez raised concerns 
about offering victims a role in the traditional two-party criminal justice process. Their 
objections persuaded the House to hold off on sending the amendment to the November 
ballot.”). 
11 Amendment, supra note 7. 
12 See infra Part V (discussing implied standing in states without any victim standing 
provisions in their constitution). 
13 See infra Part V (providing the judicial balancing of interests in the victim standing 
provisions). 
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jurisdictions has by now revealed none of the difficulties anticipated by 
opponents.14  Finally, if ratified, victim standing will improve the 
transparency of—and improve victims’ faith in—the criminal justice 
system.15  Thus, there was no legal or practical basis for the citizens of 
Illinois to have not ratified and approved this amendment.16  It will 
simply assure the enforcement of existing statutory rights of victims and 
build greater public confidence in our criminal justice system. 
Of course, a few knowledgeable attorneys—and some scholars—
have suggested several potentially negative impacts of victim 
participation in criminal prosecutions.17  As one commentator has noted: 
Part and parcel of prosecutorial discretion is the 
prosecutor's duty “to seek justice, not merely to 
convict.”  Ideally, a prosecutor pursues justice not only 
for the victims in an individual case, but also for the 
public and the defendant.  Treating the victim's concerns 
as paramount elevates the private individual above the 
public—the very opposite of what our criminal justice 
system seeks to achieve.  Washington Supreme Court 
Justice James M. Dolliver summed up this concept aptly:  
“emphasizing the conflict between the victim and the accused 
and placing the victim in the role of a quasi-prosecutor or co-
                                                 
14 See infra Part VI (presenting jurisdictions that allow victim standing in their 
constitutions). 
15 See infra Part V.C (contributing the possibility of a renewed faith in the criminal justice 
system). 
16 See infra Part VI (explaining the jurisdictions that allow victim standing in their 
constitutions). 
17 Weinhold, supra note 1, at 1.  See e.g., Tyrone Kirchengast, Victim Lawyers, Victim 
Advocates, and the Adversarial Criminal Trial, 16 NEW CRIM. L. REV. 568, 582–83 (2013) 
(“Submissions made by private counsel acting for the best interest of victims may not 
accord with the views of the community as a whole.  It is feasible that where victim lawyers 
[are] present, the decisions made by prosecutors on pretrial matters and on the evidence 
presented during trial may disproportionately take the victims' views on board in order to 
diminish any contestation between their own views and those of victims' counsel. 
Depending on the reasonableness of the submission made by victims' counsel, this may or 
may not be acceptable.  [Victim] evidence may prejudice the objectivity of the prosecutor, 
given the highly emotive and at times unchallengeable testimony that such evidence may 
supply.” (footnote omitted)).  “This position may be challenged[, however,] out of 
recognition that victim interests may be raised alongside those of the state without 
compromising the integrity of the prosecution process, or the entire due process of the 
common law.”  Id. at 573. 
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counsel . . . represents a dangerous return to the private 
blood feud mentality.18 
The problem, though, is these criticisms seem to reflect a 
misperception of the impact or effect of “victim standing” as being 
equivalent to granting a victim “party” status.19  To the contrary, the 
victim or her advocate will not, for example, be engaging in direct and 
cross-examination of witnesses, or routinely raising objections to 
evidence in open court.  Critics, therefore, have presupposed a treatment 
of and role for victims not contemplated by the advocates of “victim 
standing.”20 
In fact, in none of the several jurisdictions in which crime victims 
have standing has it been used for purposes other than moving or 
petitioning to vindicate expressed victims’ rights.21  This limited 
                                                 
18 See Danielle Levine, Comment, Public Wrongs and Private Rights:  Limiting the Victim's 
Role in a System of Public Prosecution, 104 NW. U. L. REV. 335, 352–53 (2010) (emphasizing the 
particular assumptions about the effect and operation of victim standing that are simply 
not true) (emphasis added) (footnotes omitted); see also Kirchengast, supra note 17, at 582–
83 (discussing victims’ rights).  Kirchengast states: 
[There has been] widespread criticism . . . that the victim will detract 
from processes directly aimed at affording defendants a due process 
through which to challenge accusations of wrongdoing, levelled by the 
state.  The integration of victims [might also respond] to a political 
imperative to appease the interests of a sectarian, vocal, and special 
needs group in a way that defies the defendant's right to procedural 
fairness and due process of law.  The [additional] fear is that victim 
participation will invite potentially subjective and thus prejudicial 
submissions on matters of state concern. 
Id. at 569–70. 
19 Jon Kyl et al., On the Wings of Their Angels:  The Scott Campbell, Stephanie Roper, Wendy 
Preston, Louarna Gillis, and Nila Lynn Crime Victims' Rights Act, 9 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 581, 
617 (2005) (contrasting participant and party).  The victim's right to “standing” “is 
independent of the government and that the victim exercises [that right] not through the 
prosecutor or the courts but rather as an independent participant.  While the role of a 
‘participant’ may be legally distinguishable from that of a ‘party,’ participants are afforded 
the rights and the standing to assert them . . . even if they are not parties to a case.”  Id.  
(footnote omitted). 
20 Weinhold, supra note 1, at 1 (quoting Jennifer Bishop-Jenkins, victims’ rights 
advocate).  Jennifer Bishop-Jenkins states: 
“[V]ictims don't need lengthy court proceedings to address their 
concerns.”  If a right gets violated, . . . a victim could petition the judge 
to review the situation—a process similar to filings made by witnesses 
who don't want to testify.  “All we're asking for is the same ability to 
make a motion request to the judge, with regards only to the very 
limited number of rights that we have.” 
Id. 
21 See, e.g., State v. Lamberton, 899 P.2d 939, 941 (Ariz. 1995) (holding that a victim did 
not have standing to challenge a trial court’s motion for post-conviction relief).  In 
Lamberton, the court acknowledged that under Arizona law victims have the right to be 
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participation has, in practice, created no significant impediment to the 
efficient operation of the traditional criminal process.  In fact, any 
potential conflicts with rights of defendants or prosecutorial discretion 
have been reasonably and expeditiously resolved by judges presiding in 
such proceedings.  Finally, since victims already exercise existing rights to 
be present at all proceedings, object to potential violations of their 
privacy, and speak at sentencing, it is not clear what additional 
“prejudice” to defendants, if any, would result if victims may now 
directly motion or petition trial courts to remedy denial of victims’ rights. 
This Article argues that Illinois courts are already justified in 
implying victims’ standing to enforce their expressed rights—in the 
absence of prosecutorial action or otherwise—though most courts 
apparently still feel the need for explicit legislative support.22  Second, 
vindication of victims’ rights is best accomplished through direct and 
immediate participation in criminal proceedings, rather than by filing 
separate “lawsuits” as suggested in the legislative debates.23  Third, 
substantial, persuasive precedent in several other jurisdictions with 
victims’ rights provisions reveal that courts that have adjudicated 
motions to enforce victims’ rights have avoided any significant 
impediments to the criminal justice system.24  Finally, this Article 
concludes that, given the apparently continuing dissatisfaction among 
victims with the criminal justice system, the Illinois legislature, as a 
matter of sound public policy, appropriately enacted and submitted for 
ratification the constitutional “standing amendment” and it was sensibly 
ratified on last November’s ballot.25  The amendment will simply allow 
victims to “intervene” not as “parties,” but solely to vindicate their 
rights.26 
                                                                                                             
heard at criminal proceedings, but the court stated that “we cannot conclude that victims 
are ‘parties’ with the right to file their own petitions for review.”  Id.  As a result, in order for 
victims to have standing to challenge the actions of the trial courts, victims must assert relief 
for the rights denied them.  Id. at 942. 
22 Implications of victim standing in criminal prosecutions, though often appropriate, 
are rare.  See, e.g., People v. Johnson, 12 CF 76 (Dekalb Cnty., Ill. Oct. 5, 2012) (illustrating 
one decision personally litigated by the author that granted standing and intervention to a 
victim in a criminal case); see infra Part III (implying victim standing to assert and vindicate 
their unenforced rights in Illinois as a matter of statutory interpretation). 
23 See infra Part IV.C (implying victim standing in criminal prosecutions and the analogy 
of third party intervention in criminal prosecutions). 
24 See infra Part VI (discussing jurisdictions that already have statutes and constitutional 
amendments similar to the Illinois proposed Victim’s Rights Act). 
25 See DAVIS ET AL., supra note 4, at 80 (explaining that the purpose of a victim’s rights 
amendment would broker a relationship “with dissatisfied victims”). 
26 See Amendment, supra note 7 (proposing to amend the Illinois Constitution regarding 
victims’ rights).  The pending amendment read as follows: 
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Part II briefly discusses the history, motivations, and 
accomplishments of the “movement” for victim’s rights; the political and 
legislative history leading to Article I, Section 8.1 of the Illinois 
Constitution; and the most recent successful effort to enact the 
constitutional “victims’ standing” bill to protect victims’ rights.27  Part III 
focuses on how and why crime victim “standing” may be implied from 
existing law, even without the amendment, as a matter of Illinois 
statutory interpretation.28  Part IV describes the arguments for moving 
from the existing reasonable implication of victim standing to request 
relief, at least in part from legislative history, to the justification for 
effective and efficient remedies, such as direct participation rather than 
independent litigation.29  Part V discusses the experience with implying 
standing in states without expressed victim standing while balancing the 
interests of the usual parties to the prosecution.30  Part VI discusses the 
                                                                                                             
“The victim has standing to assert the rights enumerated in subsection 
(a) in any court exercising jurisdiction over the case.  The court shall 
promptly rule on a victim’s request.  The victim does not have party 
status.  The accused does not have standing to assert the rights of a 
victim.  The court shall not appoint an attorney for the victim under 
this Section.  Nothing in this Section shall be construed to alter the 
powers, duties, and responsibilities of the prosecuting attorney. 
Id.  The amendment would delete the portion that reads, “[t]he General Assembly may 
provide by law for the enforcement of this Section.  Id.  “When the [victims’ rights 
constitutional] amendment passed, . . . [o]pponents protested that the amendment was a 
waste of time, as there could always be statutory protections [yet the] Illinois amendment 
passed with over three-fourths voter approval.”  Parness et al., supra note 3, at 74 (footnotes 
omitted).  Perhaps this was because, according to the current Act’s sponsor, Illinois State 
Rep. Louis I. Lang, D-Skokie, “[v]ictims of crimes have rights today, but under the law, 
many of those rights are unenforceable. Unless it's in the constitution, those rights will 
continue to be ignored in many courtrooms.”  Weinhold, supra note 1, at 1; see also DAVIS ET 
AL., supra note 4, at 11 (“A constitutional amendment . . . provides a level of permanency to 
the victims’ rights, since they can be changed only by another cumbersome . . . amendment 
process[, and] constitutional rights offer a level of implied enforceability.” (emphasis added)); 
David Schuman, The Right to a Remedy, 65 TEMPLE L. REV. 1197, 1208 (1992) (suggesting that 
one of the reasons victim standing requires constitutional status is that any “remedy 
guarantee applies only to those causes of action in existence at the time the guarantee 
became part of the constitution . . . but has no effect on subsequently created causes of 
action.  Thus, a legislature cannot eliminate remedies for trespass or breach of contract.  
[But it would have] a free hand . . . with respect to remedies for . . . modern inventions . . . .” 
(emphasis added)).  These “modern inventions” would presumably include victims’ rights 
statutes. 
27 See infra Part II (explaining the movement of victims’ rights from history to recent 
successes). 
28 See infra Part III (addressing victim standing and how it can be interpreted). 
29 See infra Part IV (describing a shift in victim standing relief from legislative history to 
direct participation). 
30 See infra Part V (balancing the interests of various parties in states without expressed 
victim standing). 
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precedent from jurisdictions that have expressly granted crime victims 
standing as a matter of positive law.31  This Part demonstrates the 
successful resolution of a cross-section of actual conflicts between 
victims and defendants or prosecutors regarding claims of violation of 
victims’ rights.32  Part VII analyzes the preceding Parts and suggests, as 
indicated earlier, that victim standing may be judicially implied and, if 
courts presently appear to be hesitant about doing so, this inherent 
judicial power should be ratified by the voters.33  It also suggests that 
any constitutional amendment articulating and ratifying that power 
would not, in practice, interfere with prosecutorial or judicial discretion, 
the rights of criminal defendants, or impede the administration of 
criminal justice.34 
The Article concludes that, given this amendment, the Illinois 
judiciary will more frequently and justifiably exercise their inherent 
power to imply victim standing, in  the absence of prosecutorial action or 
otherwise.35  Further, that the judiciary is more than capable of guarding 
against possible “impediments” to criminal justice by limiting victim 
standing to situations where such impediments actually present 
themselves.36  Additionally, and perhaps most important, is the 
ratification of the constitutional standing amendment which will benefit 
crime victims, and increase public confidence—and participation—in the 
system of criminal justice.37  Finally, an additional needed legislative 
initiative should be to articulate, as a rule of court, forms that have been 
successfully used elsewhere to confirm that victims’ rights have been 
respected, as well as template pleadings for use in requesting limited 
victim participation (intervention) to vindicate rights.38 
II.  THE CRIME VICTIMS’ RIGHTS MOVEMENT 
“The victim is no longer [merely] an unfortunate citizen who 
has been on the receiving end of a criminal harm, and whose 
                                                 
31 See infra Part VI (explaining the precedent jurisdiction and their successes in resolving 
conflicts between victims and defendants). 
32 See infra Part VI (discussing victims’ rights). 
33 See infra Part VII (analyzing parts I–VI). 
34 See infra Part VII (analyzing the conflicts between victims’ rights and defendants’ due 
process rights). 
35 See infra Part VIII (concluding the analysis and thesis of this Article). 
36 See infra Part VIII (approving the legislature’s abilities to protect victims’ rights). 
37 See infra Part VIII (concluding that the Victims’ Standing Constitutional Amendment 
is beneficial). 
38 See infra Part VIII (providing support to the Victims’ Standing Constitutional 
Amendment). 
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concerns are subsumed within the ‘public interest’ that guides 
the prosecution and penal decisions of the state.”39 
A. Generally 
In English common law, all crimes except treason were subject to 
private prosecution. Crimes against persons and property were 
identified as torts or “wrongs,” with the victim having the primary 
responsibility to prosecute them since the harm was seen as a private, 
rather than a social harm.40  However, by the time of the Revolutionary 
Era, there was an increasing recognition of the social harm caused by 
crime.  This led to the establishment of public prosecutors in virtually 
every colony—and to a shift away from private involvement in the 
criminal justice system.41  Still, even though the public justice system was 
established early in the colonies, it was not the only or even predominant 
means of maintaining law and order.42  Indeed, private prosecution was 
the "dominant" form of criminal prosecution in colonial America.43  This 
system of "private justice" was preferred, in part, because courts were 
generally in the capitals of the colonies, and it was difficult to travel to 
them long distances over poor roads.44  For this reason, and because 
restitution, if any, went directly to the victim and not the state, private 
prosecution actually continued in the United States well into the second 
half of the nineteenth century.45 
                                                 
39 DAVID GARLAND, THE CULTURE OF CONTROL:  CRIME AND SOCIAL ORDER IN 
CONTEMPORARY SOCIETY 11 (2001). 
40 See Douglas E. Beloof, Weighing Crime Victims’ Interests in Judicially Crafted Criminal 
Procedure, 56 CATH. U. L. REV. 1135, 1138 (2007) (“Even after identification and arrest, the 
victim carried the burden of prosecution.  He retained an attorney and paid to have the 
indictment written and the offender prosecuted.” (quoting William F. McDonald, Towards a 
Bicentennial Revolution in Criminal Justice:  The Return of the Victim, 13 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 649, 
652 (1976))). 
41 See generally, Giannini, supra note 6, at 1159–60 (discussing the nature of early private 
prosecution and the transition to public prosecution). 
42 See Bruce L. Benson, Comment, The Lost Victim and Other Failures of the Public Law 
Experiment, 9 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 399, 427 (1986) (explaining the justification of the 
public involvement in law and order). 
43 See Cassell & Joffee, supra note 6, at 178 (2011) (“[A]t the state level, private 
prosecution extended well into the nineteenth century.”). 
44 See Benson, supra note 42, at 400 (explaining why private justice was used). 
45 See Cassell & Joffee, supra note 6, at 177–81 (providing a lengthy discussion of 
substantial evidence of private prosecution of crimes until at least 1875).  See ALLEN 
STEINBERG, THE TRANSFORMATION OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE:  PHILADELPHIA, 1800–1880 (1989), 
for a comprehensive review of nineteenth century criminal prosecution in Philadelphia, the 
only American city for which such a record has been compiled. 
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The public prosecutorial system became increasingly more 
significant, however, “for both philosophical and practical reasons.”46  
The earlier “philosophical” thinking during the European “Age of 
Enlightenment” emphasized the larger societal interests of “deterrence, 
rehabilitation, and retribution,” rather than the private interests of the 
victim.47  Also, as a practical matter, the increasing development of 
professional, governmental systems of prosecution was accompanied by 
a redirection of prosecutorial focus—“the interests of the victim were 
[now] subsumed by the interests of society.”48 
The movement away from private to public prosecution, of course, 
had many positive effects for citizens.  It meant greater egalitarian justice 
with increasing numbers of prosecutions and prosecutions that were 
“properly conducted.”49  However, “the pendulum [may have] swung 
too far.”50  By the late 1960s and early 1970s, it became clear that “victims 
had been relegated solely to the role of witnesses—mere evidence for the 
state—and . . . the only harm of crime was [more clearly and 
emphatically] seen as the harm to the public at large.”51  Increasingly, 
crime victims felt marginalized.52  Academic studies showed that victim 
dissatisfaction with the criminal justice system directly impacted their 
willingness to report crimes and cooperate in their prosecution.53  As a 
result, in the 1970s, a multi-pronged social movement began, one 
described as one of the most successful “civil liberties movements of 
recent times.”54  It focused on the status of crime victims in the criminal 
justice system.55 Survivors of crime and their advocates began to 
                                                 
46 Levine, supra note 18, at 338. 
47 Id. 
48 Id. 
49 See Joanna Tucker Davis, The Grassroots Beginnings of The Victims’ Rights Movement, 
NCVLI NEWS (2005), available at http://law.lclark.edu/live/files/6453-the-grassroots-
beginnings-of-the-victims-rights, archived at http://perma.cc/8M8D-JRKP (discussing the 
beginnings of the victims’ rights movement). 
50 Id. 
51 Id.; see also Mary L. Boland & Russell Butler, Crime Victims' Rights:  From Illusion to 
Reality, 24 CRIM. JUST. 4, 5 (2009) (discussing the role of the civil rights work of the 1960s 
and 1970s). 
52 See e.g., Paul G. Cassell, Balancing the Scales of Justice:  The Case for and the Effects of 
Utah's Victims' Rights Amendment, 1994 UTAH L. REV. 1373, 1375 (stating that crime victims 
“have come to believe that the criminal justice system is out of balance, that their voices are 
not heard, and that the system is preoccupied with defendant's interests and rights”). 
53 See Davis, supra note 49 (giving examples of different organizations that crime victims 
established because of their unwillingness to cooperate with prosecution). 
54 Boland & Butler, supra note 51, at 5 (citing John W. Gillis and Douglas E. Beloof, The 
Next Step for a Maturing Victim Rights Movement:  Enforcing Crime Victims Rights in the 
Courts, 33 MCGEORGE L. REV. 689, 691 (2002)). 
55 Davis, supra note 49. 
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establish “grassroots” crime victims’ organizations.56  Indeed, some of 
the country’s most notable victims’ advocacy organizations were 
established during that time as crime rates hit an all-time high.57 
An additional impetus for advocating for victims’ rights came from 
the fact that female victims, in particular, saw increasingly more negative 
outcomes when seeking to invoke the criminal justice system.  For 
example, in Linda R. S. v. Richard D., a district attorney had refused, on a 
mother’s complaint, to institute an action against her out-of-wedlock 
child’s father because, in the prosecutor’s view, fathers of illegitimate 
children fell outside the scope of the non-support enforcement statute.58  
Regardless of the merits of any equal protection claim, the U.S. Supreme 
Court held that the mother had no standing to sue.59  That is, she had 
failed to show that enforcement of the statute would actually result in 
support of her child, rather than merely the jailing of the child’s father.60  
However, more portentous in “motivating” the movement was the Linda 
R. S. court’s dictum that “a private citizen lacks a judicially cognizable 
interest in the prosecution or non-prosecution of another.”61 
However, nearly two decades later the movement achieved one of its 
most important, early judicial victories—the Supreme Court's decision in 
Payne v. Tennessee.62  There, the Court overruled its earlier decisions in 
Booth v. Maryland and South Carolina v. Gathers, holding that victim 
impact statements were admissible at capital sentencing hearings.63  This 
                                                 
56 Id. 
57 See Marlene A. Young, Exec. Dir., Nat’l Org. for Victim Assistance, Address at the 
First National Symposium on Victims of Federal Crime:  The Victims Movement:  A 
Confluence of Forces (Feb. 10, 1997), available at http://www.trynova.org/wp-
content/uploads/file/victimsmovement.pdf, archived at http://perma.cc/W4PS-GUPK 
(addressing the history of how crime victims movement has changed over the years); see 
also Boland & Butler, supra note 51, at 5 (“The first National Crime Survey in 1972 (now 
renamed the National Crime Victimization Survey) identified crime rates much higher than 
those reported to law enforcement in the FBI's Uniform Crime Reports.  The tremendous 
toll of crime on its victims emerged into social consciousness.”). 
58 Linda R. S. v. Richard D., 410 U.S. 614, 615–16 (1973) (providing the prosecutor’s 
reasoning).  The district attorney had refused, on the mother's complaint, to institute an 
action against her child's father because, in the prosecutor’s view, fathers of illegitimate 
children fell outside the scope of the statute.  Id.  The court held that the mother failed to 
show that enforcement of the statute would actually result in support of her child rather 
than merely in the jailing of the child's father, and that “a private citizen lacks a judicially 
cognizable interest in the prosecution or nonprosecution of another.”  Id. 
59 Id. at 619. 
60 Id. at 618. 
61 Id. at 619. 
62 See Payne v. Tennessee, 501 U.S. 808, 808 (1991) (holding that the Eighth Amendment 
did not bar prohibiting a capital sentence jury from considering victim impact evidence). 
63 Booth v. Maryland, 482 U.S. 496, 496 (1987) (holding that introducing victim impact 
statements at capital punishment sentencing violated the Eight Amendment); South 
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was, said the court, one of the “new procedures and new remedies” the 
state was free to “devise” to “meet felt needs.”64  As a result of Payne, 
many states now allow victim impact statements in capital cases, and 
they are allowed almost universally in non-capital cases.65  Payne 
ameliorated the dictum in Linda R. S. by suggesting that “Congress may 
enact statutes creating legal rights, the invasion of which creates 
standing, even though no injury would exist without the statute.”66 
This background provided much of the legal foundation and social 
impetus for victims’ rights legislation in the states and, ultimately, for 
victim standing to participate in prosecutions.  State and federal 
statutes—as well as constitutional amendments—have been enacted in at 
least thirty-three states providing victims’ rights.67  Many victims' 
advocates, however, felt that this legislation was largely ineffective due 
                                                                                                             
Carolina v. Gathers, 490 U.S. 805, 812 (1989) (finding that it was an improper argument to 
make when commenting on victim’s religious tract and personal characteristics); see Payne, 
501 U.S. at 827 (1991) (stating that “if the [s]tate chooses to permit the admission of victim 
impact evidence and prosecutorial argument on that subject, the Eighth Amendment erects 
no per se bar”).  Victim impact statements provide victims the opportunity to testify about 
the harm they have experienced as a result of the crime.  Compare Paul G. Cassell, In Defense 
of Victim Impact Statements, 6 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. LAW 611, 611–48 (2009) (discussing the 
justifications for victim impact statements), with Boland & Butler, supra note 51, at 6 
(discussing case law indicating that the permissible scope of victim impact statements in 
capital cases continues to be an issue in the courts), and Kirchengast, supra note 17, at 575 
(“Victim impact evidence has . . . been widely criticized both as being of limited evidential 
value to the sentencing court and as providing victims only the slightest measure of 
participation in the criminal trial process.” (footnote omitted)), and Bryan Meyers & Edith 
Greene, The Prejudicial Nature of Victim Impact Statements:  Implications for Capital Sentencing 
Policy, 10 PSYCHOL. PUB. POL’Y & LAW 492, 492–515 (2004) (addressing the psychological 
issues of using victim impact statements). 
64 Payne, 501 U.S. at 825. 
65 See Legal Issues:  States That Allow Victim Impact Statements, DEATH PENALTY INFO. CTR., 
available at http://www.deathpenaltyinfo.org/legal-issues-states-allow-victim-impact-
statements (last visited Oct. 8, 2014), archived at http://perma.cc/VUS2-AX87 (displaying 
the states that allow victim impact statements).  But see Kirchengast, supra note 17, at 570–71 
(stating that on the other hand, “victim impact statements have been criticized as limited 
and ineffective, and as an adjunct to the criminal trial from which the victim continues to 
be excluded.  The general criticism of impact evidence is that it affords a role for victims too 
late in the prosecution process, long after important decisions have been made regarding 
charge, indictment, plea, discovery of evidence, and potentially, mode of trial.” (footnote 
omitted)). 
66 Linda R. S., 410 U.S. at 617 n.3 (citing Trafficante v. Metro Life Ins. Co., 409 U.S. 205, 
212 (1972) (White, concurring) and Hardin v. Ky. Util. Co., 390 U.S. 1, 6 (1968)). 
67 See Boland & Butler, supra note 51, at 5 (2009) (discussing state’s actions in amending 
its rights to victims); State Victim Rights Amendments, NVCAP (2012), available at 
http://www.nvcap.org/states/stvras.html, archived at http://perma.cc/93LF-8N3Q 
(displaying states with victim’s rights amendments). 
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to lack of enforcement.68  Perhaps in response to this growing 
recognition, the federal Crime Victims’ Rights Act (“CVRA”) was 
enacted in 2004.69  It guaranteed victims certain expressed rights in 
federal criminal proceedings, the most important of which may have 
been “standing” to directly enforce their rights at both the trial and 
appellate levels.70  Several states followed suit, a few granting victim 
standing through constitutional amendments—Oregon in 2008, 
California in 2008, and New Jersey in 2012.71  Constitutional “standing 
provisions,” while they did not give victims status as a “party,” were 
intended to allow crime victims to be “participants in the process,” 
rather than merely to “[have] a ‘voice’ . . . in the criminal proceedings.”72 
B. Victims’ Rights in Illinois:  Article I, Section 8.1 of the Illinois Constitution 
and the Rights of Crime Victims and Witnesses Act 
In 1993, as indicated earlier, the Illinois Constitution was amended to 
include a fairly comprehensive list of victims’ rights.73  This was 
                                                 
68 See, e.g., Giannini, supra note 6, at 1167 (“The strength of many states' victims' rights 
laws are immediately hampered by the absence of any direct method to remedy victims' 
rights violations, coupled with a lack of mandatory language to enforce those rights.”). 
69 See 18 U.S.C. § 3771 (2012) (enacting the Crime Victim’s Rights Act). 
70 Boland & Butler, supra note 51, at 8.  See generally Bandes, supra note 6, at 331–49 (1999) 
(discussing the meaning and implication of standing for victims). 
71 CA. CONST. art. I, § 28(b); OR. CONST. art. I, §§ 42–43; Crime Victims Bill of Rights, NJ 
DEP’T L. & PUB. SAFETY, available at http://www.state.nj.us/lps/dcj/victimwitness/ 
cbor.htm (last visited Oct. 8, 2014), archived at http://perma.cc/KDK7-5M48. 
72 See United States v. Hunter, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 443 at 5 (D. Utah Jan. 3, 2008); 
Boland & Butler, supra note 51, at 6 (citing Amy Baron-Evans, National Federal Defender 
Sentencing Resource Counsel, Crime Victims Rights Act (Oct. 12, 2008), available at 
http://www.fd.org, archived at http://perma.cc/VX2G-UE2Q). 
73 ILL. CONST. art. I, § 8.1(a).  The Amendment provides: 
Crime victims, as defined by law, shall have the following rights as 
provided by law:  (1) The right to be treated with fairness and respect 
for their dignity and privacy throughout the criminal justice process.  
(2) The right to notification of court proceedings.  (3) The right to 
communicate with the prosecution.  (4) The right to make a statement 
to the court at sentencing.  (5) The right to information about the 
conviction, sentence, imprisonment, and release of the accused.  (6) 
The right to timely disposition of the case following the arrest of the 
accused.  (7) The right to be reasonably protected from the accused 
throughout the criminal justice process.  (8) The right to be present at 
the trial and all other court proceedings on the same basis as the 
accused, unless the victim is to testify and the court determines that 
the victim's testimony would be materially affected if the victim hears 
other testimony at the trial.  (9) The right to have present at all court 
proceedings, subject to the rules of evidence, an advocate or other 
support person of the victim’s choice.  (10) The right to restitution. 
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followed by an act of the legislature executing that constitutional 
provision and, additionally, placing enforcement and notice duties on 
prosecutors.74  This legislation, called the Rights of Crime Victims and 
Witnesses Act (“RCVWA”), was intended to “implement, preserve[,] and 
protect the rights guaranteed to crime victims by Article I, Section 8.1 of 
the Illinois Constitution.”75  Although the Illinois General Assembly 
placed responsibility for facilitating victims’ rights in county state’s 
attorneys, the RCVWA failed to establish an enforcement mechanism in 
the event local prosecutors failed in their statutory duties, or should the 
victim wish to assert her rights independent of a prosecutor.76  Making 
matters more difficult for victims, the new law expressly precluded any 
cause of action for damages or attorneys’ fees against state actors for 
failure to facilitate victims’ rights.77  One “bright light,” though, was the 
legislative debates, which clearly expressed the intent that a separate 
“lawsuit” could be filed in the event of non-enforcement of victims’ 
rights, apparently by implication from the rights legislatively 
expressed.78  Nevertheless, for reasons discussed below, separate 
lawsuits have been rare, at best, as they are impractical and inefficient.79 
                                                                                                             
Id.  This Amendment was adopted at the general election on November 3, 1992.  Id.; see also 
Dave McKinney, Constitutional Amendment on Victims’ Rights Passes Ill. Senate, CHI. SUN 
TIMES (Apr. 25, 2012), available at http://www.suntimes.com/news/metro/12133303-
418/constitutional-amendment-guaranteeing-victims-rights-passes-ill-senate.html#.VDQq 
ar5fHG4, archived at http://perma.cc/9G25-D6WB (discussing Illinois constitutional 
amendment in victims’ rights). 
74 725 ILL. COMP. STAT. 120/4 (2010). 
75 Id. at 120/2. 
76 Id. at 120/4.5(b). 
77 Id.  The statute reads: 
This Act does not limit any rights or responsibilities otherwise enjoyed 
by or imposed upon victims or witnesses of violent crime, nor does it 
grant any person a cause of action for damages or attorneys fees.  Any 
act of omission or commission by any [person or entity] acting in good 
faith in rendering crime victim’s assistance or otherwise enforcing this 
Act shall not impose civil liability upon the individual or entity or his 
or her supervisor or employer.  Nothing in this Act shall create a basis 
for vacating a conviction or a ground for appellate relief in any 
criminal case.  Failure of the crime victim to receive notice as required, 
however, shall not deprive the court of the power to act regarding the 
proceeding before it; nor shall any such failure grant the defendant the 
right to seek a continuance. 
Id. 
78 See Transcript of Ill. Gen. Assemb., S. Trans. 33-34, 88-53, Reg. Sess. (1993), available at 
http://www.ilga.gov/Senate/transcripts/Strans88/ST051793.pdf, archived at http:// 
perma.cc/BJ6-WXL4 [hereinafter Trans. Ill. Gen. Assemb.] (showing the senate transcript of 
H.B. 1319 of the 88th Illinois General Assembly). 
79 See infra notes 139–46 and accompanying text (discussing Myers v. Daley, 521 N.E.2d 
98 (Ill. App. Ct. 1987). 
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Consequently, recent legislative efforts were made to amend the 
Illinois Constitution again, this time specifically to provide crime victims 
independent standing to participate directly in criminal prosecutions.80  
The constitutional amendatory bill was introduced in March of 2014, was 
passed by joint resolution on April 10, 2014, and was ratified on the 
November 2014 ballot.81  As this Article suggests, there were no 
legitimate reasons for not ratifying the amendatory act; it will improve 
respect for and the transparency of the criminal justice system.  
Objections to similar, earlier amendatory bills were misguided.  A 
judicially implied right of victim standing and direct participation in 
criminal proceedings already exists.82  Ratification of the legitimacy of 
this inherent judicial power by positive law, constitutionally or 
otherwise, will make such participation more common.  Finally, 
evidence from other states makes clear that no difficulties—but greater 
advantages—for the criminal justice system will now occur post-
ratification.83 
                                                 
80 See, e.g., Amendment, supra note 7 (introduced, by Rep. Lou Lang) (providing crime 
victims standing).  The Amendment: 
Proposes to amend the Bill of Rights Article of the Illinois Constitution 
concerning crime victim's rights. Provides that in addition to other 
rights provided in the Constitutional provision, a crime victim has the 
right to:  (1) be free from harassment, intimidation, and abuse; (2) 
refuse to disclose information that is privileged or confidential by law; 
(3) timely notification of all court proceedings; (4) be heard at any 
proceeding involving a post-arraignment release decision, plea, 
sentencing, post-conviction or post-adjudication release decision, and 
any post-arraignment proceeding in which a right of the victim is at 
issue; (5) receive a report related to the defendant's sentence when 
available to the accused; and (6) have the safety of the victim and the 
victim's family considered in denying or fixing the amount of bail, 
determining whether to release the defendant, and setting conditions 
of release after arrest and conviction.  Provides that a victim, victim's 
lawyer, or the prosecuting attorney may assert the victim's constitutional 
rights in court.  Provides that nothing in this Constitutional provision 
creates any cause of action for compensation or damages against the 
State, any political subdivision of the State, any officer, employee, or 
agent of the State or of any of its political subdivisions, or any officer 
or employee of the court.  Effective upon being declared adopted. 
Id. (emphasis added). 
81 Id. 
82 See infra Part III (discussing implied victim standing to assert and vindicate their 
unenforced rights as a matter of statutory interpretation). 
83 See infra Part V.A (describing the effects of denying implied standing for victims). 
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III.  IMPLYING VICTIM STANDING TO ASSERT AND VINDICATE THEIR 
UNENFORCED RIGHTS IN ILLINOIS AS A MATTER OF STATUTORY 
INTERPRETATION 
As pointed out earlier, there were no provisions in the RCVWA 
specifically allowing victims—as compared to prosecutors—standing to 
enforce allegedly denied victims’ rights.84  Nevertheless, victim standing 
to participate for this purpose can be implied as a matter of statutory 
construction supported by precedent from this and other jurisdictions.85  
The objective of statutory interpretation, of course, is to effectuate 
legislative intent.86  Any interpretive effort must begin with reliance on 
the statutory language, which is to be given its “plain meaning,” the 
most reliable indicator of intent.87  Indeed, when statutory language is 
clear and unambiguous as to its intended meaning in the context of an 
attempted application, the text generally is the sole basis for 
interpretation.88  Given ambiguity, however, the court may examine not 
just the text, but other relevant sources for determining legislative intent 
in that specific context.89  For example, when two or more reasonable 
interpretations of the statute are possible, courts may examine both 
intrinsic and extrinsic evidence of intent to resolve the ambiguity.90 
As for intrinsic evidence, every phrase or clause in a statute must be 
given its reasonable meaning in construing any other portion of that law, 
                                                 
84 See supra Part II.B (explaining victims’ rights in Illinois under the Illinois Constitution 
and the rights of Crime Victims and Witnesses Act). 
85 See generally infra Part IV (illustrating arguments for moving from a reasonable 
implication of a separate injunctive remedy to effective and efficient direct remedies); Part 
V (discussing the judicial balancing of interests in states without expressed victim standing 
provisions). 
86 Page v. Hibbard, 518 N.E.2d 69, 71 (Ill. 1987). 
87 See Gaffney v. Bd. of Tr. of Orland Fire Prot. Dist., 969 N.E.2d 359, 372 (Ill. 2012) 
(noting the plain and ordinary meaning of language used in a statute is the best indicator 
for legislative intent); Metro. Life Ins. Co. v. Washburn, 493 N.E.2d 1071, 1074 (Ill. 1986) 
(stating that for a court to give effect to a statute the court must begin with the language 
used). 
88 People ex. rel. Ill. Dep’t of Corr. v. Hawkins, 952 N.E.2d 624, 631 (Ill. 2011). 
89 Id. at 632; see also Solich v. George & Anna Portes Cancer Prevention Ctr. of Chicago, 
Inc., 630 N.E.2d 820, 822 (Ill. 1994) (stating a court can look beyond the language of a 
statute when ambiguous and consider the statute’s purpose). 
90 See People v. Purcell, 778 N.E.2d 695, 699–700 (Ill. 2002) (stating a statute is ambiguous 
if there are two or more reasonable interpretations).  For an example of the effects of 
intrinsic evidence like looking at the statute as a “whole,” see People ex rel. Republican–
Reporter Corp. v. Holmes, 239 N.E.2d 682, 685 (Ill. App. Ct. 1968), which states that when 
dealing with multiple interpretations of a statute, one must look to the entire act rather 
than specific sections thereof in order to determine the intent of the legislature when 
creating said statute. 
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and no language shall be considered superfluous.91  That is, legislation 
must be read “as a whole” in that the intended meaning of a particular 
clause or phrase is inherently dependent upon the language and intent of 
the entire statute.92  Certainly, any reasonable construction of a law must 
take into account provisions that explicitly denote its purpose.93  Thus, 
although the express language of the RCVWA speaks only of the state's 
attorney’s obligation to inform victims of their rights and facilitate their 
exercise, this does not necessarily imply that all other actors falling within 
traditional notions of “standing”—such as those “injured in fact” by 
crime—are prohibited from participating in enforcing their rights if their 
participation is consistent with statutory intent.94 
For example, one of the stated purposes of the RCVWA is “to 
implement, preserve and protect the rights guaranteed to crime victims by 
Article I, Section 8.1 of the Illinois Constitution.”95  With regard to this 
expressed “purpose,” the legislative intent can be ascertained as a matter 
of “plain meaning.”  Courts often determine “plain meaning” by 
consulting a dictionary.96  Merriam Webster's Dictionary, for instance, 
defines “implement” as “carry out, accomplish [or] to give practical effect 
to and ensure of actual fulfillment by concrete measures.”97  Among all 
these synonymous definitions of “implement,” a court is required to 
choose the most comprehensive and dynamic understanding of this 
word.98  To choose a less broad definition, one that would undermine the 
                                                 
91 See Sylvester v. Indus. Comm’n, 756 N.E.2d 822, 827 (Ill. 2001) (“[E]ach word, clause 
and sentence [of the statute], if possible, must be given reasonable meaning and not 
rendered superfluous[.]”). 
92 Blum v. Koster, 919 N.E.2d 333, 338 (Ill. 2009).  For example, the Act added 
enforcement rights to the original constitutionally enumerated protections, including 
requirements that the State inform the victim of her right, inter alia, “to retain an attorney, at 
the victim's own expense, who, upon written notice filed with the clerk of the court and 
State's Attorney, is to receive copies of all notices, motions and court orders filed thereafter in the 
case, in the same manner as if the victim were a named party in the case[.]”  725 ILL. COMP. STAT. 
120/4(b)(9) (2010) (emphasis added).  It would not be unreasonable to argue, reading the 
Act as a whole, that such a right expresses the intent that should the “attorney” discover 
that something in the prosecution regarding his client’s rights was amiss, direct action on 
her part during proceedings should be allowed. 
93 725 ILL. COMP. STAT. 120/2. (delineating the purpose of the RCVWA). 
94 See id. at 120/4.5(a)–(b)  (discussing the State’s obligations). 
95 Id. at 120/2 (emphasis added). 
96 See Gaffney, 969 N.E.2d at 372–73 (referencing Merriam Webster’s Dictionary); Kaider 
v. Hamos, 975 N.E.2d 667, 673 (Ill. App. Ct. 2012) (referencing Merriam Webster’s 
Dictionary). 
97 Implement Definition, MERRIAM-WEBSTER DICTIONARY, available at 
http://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/implement (last visited Oct. 7, 2014), 
archived at http://perma.cc/RHA5-FTRN. 
98 See Mulligan v. Joliet Reg’l Port Dist., 527 N.E.2d 1264, 1269 (Ill. 1988) (stating that 
“[s]tatutes must be construed in the most beneficial way which their language will permit 
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effectuation of constitutional rights, would contradict the intent of the 
legislature.99 
Thus, any interpretation of the RCVWA that would conclude that 
prosecutorial nonfeasance causing a denial of statutory rights should 
result in not allowing the victim to intercede for remedial purposes 
would be irrational.100  Courts are not bound by the plain or literal 
meaning of statutory language if the consequences would be absurd, that 
is, if the plain meaning would produce a result inconsistent with clearly 
expressed legislative intent, or where an interpretation would yield 
unjust consequences not contemplated by the legislature.101  Failing to 
                                                                                                             
so as to prevent hardship or injustice, and to oppose prejudice to public interests”).  See, 
e.g., In re Det. of Lieberman, 776 N.E.2d 218, 224 (Ill. 2002) (quoting Mulligan, 527 N.E.2d at 
1269); People v. Botruff, 817 N.E.2d 463, 468 (Ill. 2004) (quoting Mulligan, 527 N.E.2d at 
1269). 
99 See 725 ILL. COMP. STAT. 120/2 (providing that one purpose of the Rights of Crime 
Victims and Witnesses Act is to increase the criminal justice system). 
100 Id. 
101 See In re D.F., 802 N.E.2d 800, 805 (Ill. 2003) (noting a court does not have to follow a 
literal interpretation of a statute that produces unjust consequences).  The court in In re D.F. 
stated: 
A plain language or literal reading of section 1(D)(m) supports 
respondent's position that the nine-month evaluation period applies 
only to a parent's reasonable progress and not a parent's reasonable 
efforts.  A court, however, is not bound by the literal language of a 
statute that produces a result inconsistent with clearly expressed 
legislative intent, or that yields absurd or unjust consequences not 
contemplated by the legislature.  A literal reading of section 1(D)(m) 
yields a result inconsistent with the legislature's statements of public 
policy and purpose contained in both the Juvenile Court Act and the 
Adoption Act. 
Id. (citations omitted) (emphasis added); see also People v. Hanna, 800 N.E.2d 1201, 1207–08 
(Ill. 2003) (stating statutes should be construed to avoid absurdity and listing cases 
supporting the court’s ability to avoid construing a statute in a manner that would lead to 
an absurd result); In re Det. of Lieberman, 776 N.E.2d at 224, 226 (repeating that statutes 
should not be construed in a manner which produces injustice and expressing that courts 
are not bound to the literal language of a statute when it would defeat the intent of the 
legislature); Collins v. Bd. of Tr. of Firemen’s Annuity & Ben. Fund of Chicago, 610 N.E.2d 
1250, 1254 (Ill. 1993) (“[C]ourts are not bound by the literal language of a particular clause 
that might defeat such clearly expressed intent.”) (citing Cont’l Ill. Nat’l Bank & Trust Co. 
v. Ill. State Toll Highway Comm'n, 251 N.E.2d 253, 259 (Ill. 1969)).  In Collins the court 
indicated that: 
Therefore, when the spirit and intent of the legislature are clearly 
expressed and the objects and purposes of a statute are clearly set 
forth, the courts are not bound by the literal language of a particular 
clause that might defeat such clearly expressed intent.  Ambiguity 
caused by a literal and confined construction may be modified, 
changed or rejected to conform to an otherwise clear legislative intent 
and the judiciary has the authority to read language into a statute that 
the legislature omitted through oversight.  Existing circumstances at 
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allow standing for victims to rectify denial of their constitutional rights 
in the absence of any other convenient remedy would create an absurd 
or at least an irrational result. 
Another expressed purpose of the RCVWA is “to ensure that crime 
victims are treated with fairness and respect for their dignity and privacy 
throughout the criminal justice system.”102  The reasonable implication 
from this language would be that the legislature has delegated to the 
judiciary the discretionary power to do whatever would be “fair” in a 
“flexible” and “broad” manner.103  There are, of course, contexts in which 
a “flexible” and “broad” interpretation of amorphous language would be 
unwarranted.  In NAB Bank v. LaSalle, for example, the use of the term 
“justice” in a statute was held not to provide the court with 
“untrammeled judicial discretion” in interpretation.104  That statute 
concerned foreclosure sales, an aspect of property law with a centuries-
old tradition of established equitable principles.105  In NAB Bank, the 
court assumed that the legislature meant for the word “justice” in 
foreclosure matters to refer to this long tradition, as opposed to having 
the judiciary redefine notions of “justice” already developed over the 
course of the common law.106  There is, on the other hand, no similar 
tradition of application of terms like “fairness,” “respect,” or “dignity” in 
the context of victim's rights legislation.107  Thus, there is no preexisting 
meaning or tradition of “fairness” to which courts must defer in deciding 
                                                                                                             
the time the statute was enacted, contemporaneous conditions, and the 
object sought to be achieved all may be considered. 
Id. (citations omitted); see also People v. Hudson, 263 N.E.2d 473, 476 (Ill. 1970) (explaining 
that the rules of statutory construction must yield when intent of legislature is otherwise 
indicated); People v. Pohl, 969 N.E.2d 508, 513 (Ill. App. Ct. 2012) (“We may also consider 
the consequences that would result from construing the statute one way or the other, and, 
in doing so, we must presume that the legislature did not intend absurd, inconvenient, or 
unjust consequences.”); Grams v. Autozone, Inc., 745 N.E.2d 687, 690 (Ill. App. Ct. 2001) 
(noting the court may consider the reasons for a law when determining legislative intent). 
102 725 ILL. COMP. STAT. 120/2 (2010) (emphasis added). 
103 See Mulligan, 527 N.E.2d at 1269 (“Statutes must be construed in the most beneficial 
way which their language will permit so as to prevent hardship or injustice, and to oppose 
prejudice to public interests.”); see also Lake Cnty. Bd. of Review v. Prop. Tax Appeal Bd., 
519 N.E.2d 459, 461 (Ill. 1988) (stating that terms must be given their ordinary meaning and 
interpreted to give the terms its full meaning); Ill. Nat’l Bank v. Chegin, 220 N.E.2d 226, 228 
(Ill. 1966) (noting that courts have frequently held that absurd interpretations should be 
avoided). 
104 984 N.E.2d 154, 160 (Ill. App. Ct. 2013) (citing Aurora Loan Servs., Inc. v. Craddieth, 
442 F.3d 1018, 1028 (7th Cir. 2006)). 
105 Id. 
106 Id. 
107 In the Interest of K.P., 709 A.2d 315, 321–22 (N.J. Super. Ct. Ch. Div. 1997) (discussing 
the application and definitions of fairness, respect, and dignity). 
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whether to imply and allow victim standing to enforce their 
constitutional rights. 
This was the fundamental insight of the New Jersey Supreme Court 
in In the Interest of K.P. in interpreting the language of their state 
constitution.108  As in the Illinois Constitution, New Jersey specifically 
required “fairness” for victims.109  The court reasoned that the legislature 
intended for this word to be given some judicially ascertainable 
substance because there was no preexisting legal context that might 
provide interpretive content to the statutory “fairness” language.110  As a 
result, the court held that the legislature had impliedly delegated power 
to the court to “creatively” effectuate the command of “fairness” in this 
new context—enforcing victims’ rights laws—by implying victim 
standing to vindicate their own rights.111  Illinois courts have an equally 
sound basis for construing the terms “fairness,” “dignity,” and “respect” 
under Illinois law to imply victim standing for the same purpose. 
It is also important to note that the Act does not expressly or by 
implication prohibit victims’ standing to request injunctive relief when 
their rights have been denied for reasons beyond their control.112  It only 
prohibits to “any person a cause of action for damages or attorneys fees” 
for non- or misfeasance by public officials.113  Therefore, standing to seek 
enforcement of denied statutory rights through injunction is not 
impermissible.114  The expressed statutory prohibition applied only to 
legal claims; seeking standing to participate or “intervene” in an existing 
                                                 
108 See id. at 323 (interpreting N.J. CONST. art I, pt. 22). 
109 Id. at 321. 
110 Id. at 322. 
111 Id. at 323. 
112 725 ILL. COMP. STAT. 120/9 (2010).  The statute reads: 
This Act does not limit any rights or responsibilities otherwise enjoyed 
by or imposed upon victims or witnesses of violent crime, nor does it 
grant any person a cause of action for damages or attorneys fees.  Any act 
of omission or commission by any [person or entity] acting in good 
faith in rendering crime victim's assistance or otherwise enforcing this 
Act shall not impose civil liability upon the individual or entity or his or 
her supervisor or employer.  Nothing in this Act shall create a basis for 
vacating a conviction or a ground for appellate relief in any criminal 
case.  Failure of the crime victim to receive notice as required, 
however, shall not deprive the court of the power to act regarding the 
proceeding before it; nor shall any such failure grant the defendant the 
right to seek a continuance. 
Id. (emphasis added). 
113 Id. 
114 RUBEN E. AGPALO, STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION 227 (5th ed. 2003).  This flows from the 
interpretive maxim “expressio unius est exclusio alterius[,]” “[w]here a [clause or provision] is 
expressly limited to certain matters, it may not, by interpretation or construction, be 
extended to [other matters].”  Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). 
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criminal action to pursue judicial orders to enforce victims’ constitutional 
rights as a matter of equity is a different matter.115  Indeed, Section 9 of 
the Act might easily be read to have intentionally excluded equitable 
remedies so as to preserve those remedies for criminal victims in the 
event of official non- or misfeasance.116 
As for extrinsic evidence, the legislative debates on the RCVWA 
indicate an intent that victims who are denied their rights should be able 
to bring “a lawsuit” to enforce those rights.117  This “right to remedy” 
                                                 
115 See generally John F. Preis, In Defense of Implied Injunctive Relief in Constitutional Cases, 
22 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 1, 1 (2013) (“If Congress has neither authorized nor prohibited a 
suit to enforce the Constitution, may the federal courts create one nonetheless?  At present, 
the answer mostly turns on the form of relief sought:  if the plaintiff seeks damages, the 
Supreme Court will normally refuse relief unless Congress has specifically authorized it; in 
contrast, if the plaintiff seeks an injunction, the Court will refuse relief only if Congress has 
specifically barred it. . . .  [I]mplied injunctive relief does not contravene separation of 
powers principles because Congress and the federal courts have, since the Founding, 
viewed implied injunctive relief as permissible and even appropriate.” (emphasis added)). 
116 See The Comm’n on Audit of the Province of CEBU v. Province of CEBU, G.R. No. 
141386 (S.C., Nov. 29, 2001), available at http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2001/ 
nov2001/141386.htm, archived at http://perma.cc/D896-JKZQ (referencing that in 
accordance with the interpretive maxim “casus omissus pro omisso habendus est.[,] [a] person, 
object or thing omitted from an enumeration in a statute must be held to have been omitted 
intentionally”). 
117 See Trans. Ill. gen. Assemb., supra note 78, at 33–39 (discussing H.B. 1319).  During the 
Senate’s discussion of the Rights of Crime Victims and Witnesses Act, Senator Klemm 
stated: 
It appears on the analysis, Senator, that the bill gives the victims of 
violent crime apparently twenty-four rights, but I see there appears to 
be no enforcement mechanism.  And I was concerned about if a right 
was violated, then, of a victim, which we all support their rights, and 
there is no way for the victim, then , to gain redress—if, in fact, there’s 
no penalty, I’m wondering, what does the victim gain?  And it seems 
that they’re no better off than they were without the constitutional 
amendment if there’s no penalty for not giving them their just due. 
Id. at 33 (quoting statement from Senator Klemm).  In response Senator Cullerton replied: 
No, I disagree with you, Senator.  This bill directs, for the most part, 
judges and the State’s attorney as to what the procedures are with 
regard to victims in the criminal justice process.  Now I certainly am 
not going to put a criminal penalty in here for, you know, the State’s 
attorneys or for the judges.  This is a constitutional right.  This bill 
codifies that constitutional right.  And of course, [if] there was some 
State’s attorney around the State of Illinois that chose to intentionally 
violate the clear provisions of this Statute, ultimately someone would 
have to bring a lawsuit, but the fact that it’s a constitutional 
amendment, and the fact that it’s clearly stated in the law, does 
provide the enforcement provisions that are necessary to ensure the 
rights of these victims. 
Id. at 33–34 (quoting statement from Senator Cullerton).  Senator Klemm furthered his 
position by stating: 
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was apparently understood by the Illinois legislature to be implied from 
the existence of the original rights granted by the Constitution and the 
Act.118  Regardless of the fact that the law disallows any claim for 
                                                                                                             
Well, it seems to me, Senator, that the existing law already has that.  
And if—if a victim were denied any restitution, I mean, what recourse 
would they have?  And as you know, I think, there’s no right for suit 
now, and I don’t think that when you said you could sue them, that 
that would be allowed, and I don’t agree with that.  Maybe you could 
clarify that for us. 
Id. at 34 (quoting statement from Senator Klemm).  Senator Cullerton agreed with some of 
Senator Klemm’s statement by saying: 
Well, you’re right.  Because there’s a constitutional amendment that’s 
on the books, the way that someone can enforce it is to file a lawsuit 
citing the Constitution.  That—that much I—I agree with you on.  
However, this bill gives specifics to that constitutional 
amendment. . . .  So, the fact is, the bill flushes out the constitutional 
amendment.  It makes it clear to the State’s attorney, the judges and 
the victim what their rights are.  If there’s a question about them not 
being enforced, ultimately it would come down to a lawsuit, but 
hopefully, because we will pass this bill, that lawsuit will be 
unnecessary. 
Id. at 34–35 (quoting statement from Senator Cullerton).  Senator Butler joined the 
discussion stating, “I can’t detect an enforcement procedure in here.  It’s voluntary; do you 
agree?”  Id. at 36 (quoting statement from Senator Butler).  Senator Cullerton responded: 
Now you asked about enforcement.  If the State’s attorneys want to 
violate this Statute, or the judges want to violate this Statute, my 
suggestion is, rather than put a criminal penalty in, or a fine—you’re 
not going to fine the judge or the State’s attorney—you put in the 
clearest status of the law and what the law is intended to mean.  And if 
someone feels that their rights are being violated, they have to file a 
lawsuit.  That’s really the only practical way, in order to implement the 
provisions of the Statute. 
Trans. Ill. Gen. Assemb., supra note 78, at 36–37 (quoting statement from Senator Cullerton) 
(emphasis added).  Senator Cullerton went on to state: 
But I think that the provisions are clear, that the State’s attorneys and 
the judges in this State will follow the law, and if there has to be—if 
there’s one that does not want to, a lawsuit can be provided—be brought 
forward to ensure the rights of the victims. . . .  Senator Butler, the 
amendment talks about not being able to impose civil liability upon 
the—the individual—that is, the State’s attorney—for failure to 
provide—to follow one of the provisions of this Act.  But that doesn’t 
mean that the victim can’t bring a lawsuit to enforce the provisions of the Act.  
And that’s what this bill is all about.” 
Id. at 37–39 (quoting statement from Senator Cullerton) (emphasis added). 
118 Id. at 33–35.  While responding to questions about how the RCVWA would be 
“enforced” if the rights granted to victims were denied, Senator John Cullerton explained 
that “the fact that it’s a constitutional amendment, and the fact that it’s clearly stated in the 
law, does provide the enforcement provisions that are necessary to ensure the rights of 
these victims.”  Id. at 34.  “If there’s a question about them not being enforced, ultimately it 
would come down to a lawsuit . . . .”  Id. at 34–35; see also In re Scarlett Z.-D., 11 N.E.3d 360, 
387 (Ill. App. Ct. 2014) (discussing the roots of Ill. Const. of 1970, art. I, § 12 in Marbury v. 
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damages for lack of prosecutorial enforcement, the debates make clear 
that victims should have standing to vindicate rights through a 
“lawsuit,” which suggests an implication of an intended “right to 
remedy,” even if through corollary proceedings such as requests for 
injunctive relief. 
Finally, as for a “right to remedy,” legislative intent regarding 
enforcement of victims’ rights must be understood in a manner 
consistent with other constitutional provisions that speak to a citizen’s 
right to a remedy for denied vested rights.  All other provisions on the 
same topic—remedying denied rights—should be read in pari materia 
with the victims’ rights provisions.119  One such provision, the 
contemporary Illinois constitutional “remedies clause,” might provide 
some guidance.120  The clause can be said to originate from and reflect 
the promises extracted from King John, as reflected within the Magna 
Carta:  “To no one will we sell, to no one will we refuse or delay, right or 
justice.”121  Centuries later, Blackstone famously reflected that:  “it is a 
[settled] and invariable principle in the laws of England, that every right 
when withheld mu[s]t have a remedy, and every injury [its] proper 
redre[s]s.”122 
Although the federal Bill of Rights did not acknowledge this 
principle or reflect such a right, early in the history of the republic the 
U.S. Supreme Court—apparently without feeling obliged to cite 
precedent due to it being considered a self-evident truth by that time—
recognized the vital link between a right and a remedy: 
                                                                                                             
Madison, 5 U.S. 137, 163 (1803).  “Every person shall find a certain remedy in the laws for 
all injuries and wrongs which he receives to his person, privacy, property, or reputation.  
He shall obtain justice by law, freely, completely, and promptly.”  Id. at n.9 (quoting ILL. 
CONST. of 1970, art. I, § 12). 
119 34 ILL. LAW AND PRAC. STATUTES § 72 (2001).  Statutes in pari materia (laws relating to 
the same subject matter) must be interpreted in light of each other since they have a 
common purpose for comparable events or items.  Id.  As Lord Mansfield wrote in Rex v. 
Loxdale, “[w]here there are different statutes in pari materia, though made at different times, 
or even expired and not referring to each other, they shall be taken and construed together, 
as one system and as explanatory of each other.”  VINCENT CRABBE, UNDERSTANDING 
STATUTES 75 (1994) (quoting Rex v. Loxdale, 1 Burr. 445, 447 (1758)). 
120 ILL. CONST. art. I, § 12 (“Every person shall find a certain remedy in the laws for all 
injuries and wrongs which he receives to his person, privacy, property or reputation. He 
shall obtain justice by law, freely, completely, and promptly.”).   
121 Schuman, supra note 26, at 1199 (quoting WILLIAM MCKECHNIE, MAGNA CARTA:  A 
COMMENTARY ON THE GREAT CHARTER OF KING JOHN 395 (2d ed. 1914) and SAMUEL E. 
THORNE ET AL., THE GREAT CHARTER 132 (1965)) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
122 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, 3 COMMENTARIES ON THE LAWS OF ENGLAND:  IN FOUR BOOKS 
109 (1800), available at https://archive.org/stream/lawsofengland03blaciala#page/ 
n133/mode/2up, archived at http://perma.cc/8CLH-DLXT. 
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The very essence of civil liberty certainly consists in the 
right of every individual to claim the protection of the 
laws, whenever he receives an injury. . . .  The 
government of the United States has been emphatically 
termed a government of laws, and not of men.  It will 
certainly cease to deserve this high appellation, if the 
laws furnish no remedy for the violation of a vested 
legal right.123 
“Remedy amendments” were present in several early state 
constitutions which preceded the federal constitution.124  They continue 
to exist in many modern state constitutions, including that of Illinois.125  
These provisions reflected the American experience, which differed from 
that in England, in that the evil to eradicate was not so much corrupt 
courts as it was wayward legislatures, bodies that might attempt to 
eliminate—or not provide—remedies for vested claims of right.126  
Remedy provisions, of course, result from different state histories and 
framers’ intent and thus individual state interpretations will tend to 
differ.127  In Illinois, for example, the legislature is free to revoke or 
repeal a remedy for a cause of action not allowed at common law at the 
time of the enactment of the constitutional “remedy provision,” but that 
would not apply to claims already “vested” under current law.128 
The Illinois Supreme Court, in other words, has limited the “right to 
remedy” to “vested rights,” with the enforcement mechanism being the 
due process clause of the Illinois Constitution.129  While there has been 
                                                 
123 Marbury, 5 U.S. at 163; see BERNARD SCHWARTZ, THE BILL OF RIGHTS:  A DOCUMENTARY 
HISTORY 967–68 (1971) (providing no right to a remedy). 
124 Schuman, supra note 26, at 1200 (indicating several state constitutions provided 
remedy amendments before the federal constitution). 
125 ILL. CONST. art. I, § 12; see Schuman, supra note 26, at 1201 (listing state statutes that 
provide citizens a constitutional “right to a remedy”). 
126 See Schuman, supra note 26, at 1201 (stating that many American courts were 
concerned with “renegade legislatures that had for example deprived injured creditors of 
their judicial remedies against debtors by passing legislation impairing existing contractual 
obligations”). 
127 See id. (suggesting states differ in interpreting remedy provisions); see also e.g., ROBERT 
F. WILLIAMS, THE LAW OF AMERICAN STATE CONSTITUTIONS 9 (2009) (providing varying 
interpretations of state constitutions among the states). 
128 See WILLIAMS, supra note 127, at 159–60 (suggesting the Illinois Supreme Court 
departed from longstanding United States Supreme Court precedent without relying on 
legislative history nor intent existing at the time of a law’s enactment and showing the 
Illinois Supreme Court’s reluctance to accept a law’s expansion by the United States 
Supreme Court, where the expansion would conflict with well-established state law). 
129 See First of America Trust Co. v. Armstead, 664 N.E.2d 36, 39 (Ill. 1996); see also ILL. 
CONST. art I, § 2 (providing the Due Process and Equal Protection clause of the Illinois 
constitution). 
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some reluctance to give a precise definition of a vested right, the Court 
has said that it is “an expectation that is so far perfected that it cannot be 
taken away by legislation[;] . . . a complete and unconditional demand or 
exemption that may be equated with a property interest.”130  This would 
appear to be the case with claims for violation of provisions expressing 
constitutional or statutory rights, especially where they include a duty on 
the part of state prosecutors to enforce those rights.131  Once a 
prosecution is begun, victims’ rights are vested—as are defendants’ 
rights—and if the prosecutor fails to facilitate those rights in a pending 
prosecution, as required by law, the victim should have a practical and 
effective remedy.132 
Thus, the Illinois due process clause, when read together with the 
remedies provision, guards against the denial of any remedy at all to a 
plaintiff with a vested claim, which would be the case were the county 
prosecutor to fail in her duty to enforce or facilitate a victim’s right.133  
                                                 
130 Armstead, 664 N.E.2d at 40 (highlighting the Court’s reluctance to define a vested 
right) (emphasis added).  It is reasonable to assume that victims’ rights provisions 
enforcing constitutional provisions provide victims with “an expectation that is so far 
perfected” that they can make “a complete and unconditional demand” to enjoin provision 
of those rights.  Id. 
131 See 725 ILL. COMP. STAT. 120/4.5(b) (2010) (establishing enforcement of victims’ rights 
in the Illinois Attorney General’s office). 
132 See, e.g., Allen Thomas O’Rourke, Refuge from a Jurisprudence of Doubt:  Hohfeldian 
Analysis of Constitutional Law, 61. S.C. L. REV. 141, 142–43, 160 (2009) (applying the 
Hohfeldian analysis to federal constitutional rights).  Wesley Hohfeld (1879–1918) was an 
American legal theorist.  Id. at 144.  He argued that right and duty are correlative concepts, 
i.e., that one must always be matched by the other.  Id. at 160.  Hohfeldian analysis is now 
used in discussing constitutional issues.  Id. at 143.  This analysis provides another view of 
rights and when they vest.  For example, the Supreme Court in Blessing v. Freedstone, 520 
U.S. 329, 340 (1997) impliedly using Hohfeld’s concept of a “right,” held that to enforce a 
federal statute under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, “a plaintiff must assert the violation of a federal 
right, not merely a violation of federal law.”  Id. at 340 (citing Golden State Transit Corp. v. 
Los Angeles, 493 U.S. 103, 106 (1989).  The Court then identified three factors to determine 
whether a particular statutory provision creates a right: 
First, [a legislature] must have intended that the provision in question 
benefit the plaintiff. . . .  Second, the plaintiff must demonstrate that 
the right assertedly protected by the statute is not so ‘vague and 
amorphous’ that its enforcement would strain judicial 
competence. . . .  Third, the statute must unambiguously impose a 
binding obligation on the States. 
Id. at 340–41 (citation omitted). 
133 Otherwise, a prosecutor could negate the legislative policy reflected in Section 8.1 of 
the Illinois Constitution and its enabling statute.  In other words, withholding of an 
enforcement remedy for failing to provide statutory victims' rights would be treating such 
a deprivation as a non-injury, negating the positive law creating those rights.  Schuman, 
supra note 26, at 1207–08.  “A person acquires a vested right to a remedy for a cause of 
action when that cause of action ‘accrues.’”  Id. at 1207.  To determine when the cause of 
action accrues, one must look to the applicable local law and if at the time the cause of 
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Further, although the crime victims’ law makes no such distinction as to 
types of crime, an even stronger case for implied direct enforcement by 
domestic violence victims flows from the existence of the Illinois 
Domestic Violence Act of 1986, where the legislature had earlier—and 
now has twice—affirmed its intent to provide victims of that crime with 
remedies.134  In any event, assuming that a right to remedy may be 
implied, and that separate equitable if not legal actions reasonably can be 
implied as that remedy, victims' standing to directly participate in criminal 
proceedings for vindication of her rights would seem to reasonably 
follow. 
IV.  VICTIM STANDING TO PARTICIPATE IN CRIMINAL PROSECUTIONS TO SEEK 
RELIEF FOR DENIED RIGHTS:  FROM A REASONABLE IMPLICATION OF A 
SEPARATE INJUNCTIVE REMEDY TO EFFECTIVE AND EFFICIENT DIRECT 
REMEDIES 
The 1993 legislative debates on the Victims’ Rights Act indicate that, 
should a prosecutor fail to facilitate or enforce victims’ rights, “a 
lawsuit” could be filed to seek relief.135  Actually, this understanding—
apparently shared by the General Assembly—of an implied right to 
remedy for victims in Illinois preceded those debates.  Although not 
permitted under current law, in 1987 an Illinois court implied a separate 
suit for damages for denial of victims’ rights.136  In Myers v. Daley, a victim 
of a crime attempted to obtain information from the state’s attorney as to 
whether the state was going to prosecute his case.137  After several 
inquiries were ignored, the victim sued to enforce his rights under an 
earlier version of the Illinois Bill of Rights for Victims and Witnesses of 
Violent Crime Act.138  In response, the state’s attorney informed the 
                                                                                                             
action accrued, there was a viable remedy, no subsequent laws may take away that 
remedy.  Id. at 1208. 
134 750 ILL. COMP. STAT. 60/101-401 (2010); see 725 ILL. COMP. STAT. 120/1-9 (supplying 
legislative intent); 750 ILL. COMP. STAT. 60/102 (2), (6) (declaring that among the 
“purposes” of the law are to “facilitate accessibility of remedies under the Act to provide 
immediate and effective assistance and protection [to domestic violence victims],” and to 
“[e]xpand the civil and criminal remedies for victims of domestic violence . . . .”); see also 
Rebecca Goddard, Note, When It’s the First Time Every Time:  Eliminating the “Clean Slate” of 
Pretrial Diversions in Domestic Violence Crimes, 49 VAL. U. L. REV. 267, 302–04 (2014) 
(discussing the importance of appropriate remedies to victims of domestic violence). 
135 See infra note 158 (providing example state legislation based on pertinent sections of 
the Act). 
136 Myers v. Daley, 521 N.E.2d 98, 100 (Ill. App. Ct. 1987). 
137 See id. at 99 (showing victims requested information on multiple occasions). 
138 See id. (invoking the Act in a letter to the State’s Attorney).  The Illinois Bill of Rights 
for Victims and Witnesses of Violent Crime Act was originally codified in chapter 38, 
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victim of the status of the case and asked that he voluntarily drop his 
complaint.139  The victim agreed, but only if the State would pay his 
court costs of ninety-two dollars and thirty cents.140  The state’s attorney 
refused, and the victim then filed a second action requesting an award of 
the court costs.141  The appellate court ordered the State to pay the 
victim's costs, noting that to direct otherwise would run counter to the 
purpose of the Illinois victims' rights act, which required that “upon  
request by the victim of a violent crime, the State’s Attorney must inform 
the victim of the status of the State’s Attorney’s investigation of the 
case.”142  According to the Myers court, “the purpose of the Act would be 
frustrated if a victim were forced to file suit to learn the status of his case, 
and were also burdened with the costs of that suit.”143  This decision, 
implying a cause of action from the Act so as not to frustrate legislative 
intent, presented the justification for the judicial implication of a claim 
for a separate remedy for denied rights apart from the criminal 
prosecution, and in addition to implied standing as a matter of statutory 
construction. 
A. Victims’ Standing to Sue Separately for Equitable Relief:  The Analogy of 
Implying Causes of Action in Civil Practice 
Since suits for damages against public officials for victims’ rights 
violations are now expressly precluded, however, another remaining 
option would be a separate cause of action for equitable relief.144  Yet, 
notwithstanding some discussion in the legislative debates suggesting 
                                                                                                             
paragraph 1401 et seq. of the Illinois Revised Statutes (1985).  See 725 ILL. COMP. STAT. 120 
(2010) (providing the current language). 
139 725 ILL. COMP. STAT. 120. 
140 See Myers, 521 N.E.2d at 99–100 (dismissing complaint and awarding court costs). 
141 See id. at 100 (detailing the State’s Attorney’s appeal of the order assessing court costs 
following the dismissal of the complaint). 
142 Id.; see 725 ILL. COMP. STAT. 120/4 (providing the language of the Act). 
143 Myers, 521 N.E.2d at 100. 
144 See supra notes 76–78, 112–16 (precluding the collection of damages and discussing the 
distinction between prohibition of legal and equitable remedies).  It should be noted, 
however, that while statutorily prohibited in Illinois, damages suits under these 
circumstances exist in other jurisdictions.  See, e.g., ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 13-4437.B (2000) 
(demonstrating Arizona's victims' rights statute, for example, includes a provision which 
reads that “[a] victim has the right to recover damages from a governmental entity 
responsible for the intentional, knowing or grossly negligent violation of the victim's rights 
under the victims' bill of rights”).  ARIZ. CONST. art. II, § 2.1.  In Arizona, a “victim [also] 
has standing to seek an order, [or] to bring a special action [mandating that the victim be 
afforded] any right or to challenge an order denying any right guaranteed to victims under 
the victims' bill of rights, . . . any implementing legislation or court rules.”  ARIZ. REV. STAT. 
§ 13-4437(A)–(B) (2000).  Utah law also provides that victims may bring a variety of special 
actions, although not for damages, to enforce their rights.  UTAH CODE § 77-38-11 (2010). 
Schlam: Enforcing Victim's Rights in Illinois:  The Rationale for Victim
Produced by The Berkeley Electronic Press, 2015
626 VALPARAISO UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 49 
that a “lawsuit” could be filed, there is, of course, no expressed statutory 
right to file for injunctive relief.  However, as in Myers, an Illinois court 
may imply an individual cause of action from a statute if: 
(1) plaintiff is a member of the class for whose benefit 
the Act was enacted; (2) it is consistent with the 
underlying purpose of the Act; (3) plaintiff’s injury is 
one that the Act was designed to prevent; and (4) it is 
necessary to provide an adequate remedy for violations 
of the Act.145 
Unlike federal courts, Illinois courts do not require potential 
plaintiffs to show that the legislature intended to create a private cause of 
action, only that the legislature did not expressly indicate any intent to 
limit the remedies available to those provided under the Act.146  
Consequently, in addition to the supportive comments in the legislative 
history, and although claims for damages are precluded, an implied 
equitable cause of action would be justified.147 
There are four reasons Illinois courts could have found that victims 
have standing to join a criminal case via an equitable cause of action.  
First, crime victims, by definition, are within the class the victims’ rights 
provisions were intended to benefit.148  Second, an equitable cause of 
action is consistent with the statute’s underlying purpose because the 
rights granted to victims are for their protection.149  Third, the statute is 
                                                 
145 See Corgan v. Muehling, 574 N.E.2d 602, 609 (Ill. 1991) (holding that the Psychologist 
Registration Act implied a cause of action for a patient injured by an unregistered 
psychologist).  Also, a separate cause of action may be implied where the statute would be 
practically ineffective without such an implication.  See also Fisher v. Lexington Health 
Care, Inc., 722 N.E.2d 1115, 1119–20 (Ill. 1999) (establishing alternative means for implying 
a private right of action). 
146 See Sawyer Realty Group, Inc. v. Jarvis Corp., 432 N.E.2d 849, 852 (Ill. 1982) 
(recognizing a private right of action in the absence of an express remedy and limiting 
private rights of action only where the legislature expressly precludes it).  To imply a 
private cause of action from a federal statute, a plaintiff must show that a specific 
legislative intent to create a private cause of action exists under the statute.  See, e.g., 
Alexander v. Sandoval, 532 U.S. 275, 284 (2001) (holding that there is no private cause of 
action to enforce Title VI disparate-impact regulations due to a lack of legislative intent). 
147 UTAH CODE ANN. § 77-38-11(1) (specifying Utah law allows for a separate equitable 
suit).  “If a person acting under color of state law willfully or wantonly fails to perform 
duties so that the rights [of crime victims] are not provided, an action for injunctive relief, 
including prospective injunctive relief, may be brought against the individual and the 
governmental entity that employs the individual.”  Id. 
148 See 725 ILL. COMP. STAT. 120/3(a) (2010) (defining a crime victim subject to the Act). 
149 See ILL. CONST. art. I, § 8.1 (outlining rights guaranteed to crime victims); see also 725 
ILL. COMP. STAT. 120/2 (establishing the purpose of the Act is to protect a victim’s rights 
under ILL. CONST. art. I, § 8.1). 
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intended to prevent prosecutorial non- or misfeasance that causes crime 
victims further injury by losing their express rights.150  Finally, rather 
than a private cause of action, direct victim intervention is necessary 
because, otherwise, victims will have no other means to enforce their 
rights.151  No one has brought a separate lawsuit in Illinois, even though 
there is a growing sense that victims’ rights have often been, and 
continue to be, ignored.152  Perhaps this curious lack of separate litigation 
results from the reasonable assumption that although the legislature 
intended to enforce express rights, they intended effective and efficient 
enforcement of those rights, and a separate lawsuit is neither effective 
nor efficient.153  
B. The Argument for Direct Victims’ Participation in Criminal Proceedings 
to Enforce Denied Rights in Lieu of Separate Equitable Actions 
“Statutes must be construed in the most beneficial way which their 
language will permit so as to prevent hardship or injustice, and to oppose 
prejudice to public interests.”154  A separate lawsuit would be just such a 
                                                 
150 Although the Illinois General Assembly limited the remedies available under the 
RCVWA by expressly denying “cause[s] of action for damages or attorneys fees,” the 
General Assembly did not indicate intent to exclude equitable relief.  725 ILL. COMP. STAT. 
120/9.  To the contrary, the sponsor of the Act, State Senator John Cullerton, stated that a 
victim could bring “a lawsuit” to vindicate her rights.  See Trans. Ill. Gen. Assemb., supra 
note 78, at 34 (providing statements of State Sen. Cullerton). 
151 See Trans. Ill. Gen. Assemb., supra note 78, at 34 (articulating the necessity for a private 
right of action). 
152 See DAVIS ET AL., supra note 4, at 12–13 (“Despite . . . remarkable progress in the 
passage of crime victims’ rights, advocates have been dismayed to see that, too often, 
victims’ rights were violated with impunity.  An NIJ-funded survey of crime victims in 
1998 found that, even within states with strong victims’ rights legislation, many victims 
were not notified about key hearings and proceedings, many were not given the 
opportunity to be heard, and few received restitution.  Although victims in these states 
generally fared better than those in states with weak victims’ rights legislation, as many as 
one-third of victims in strong-protection states were not afforded the opportunity to 
exercise certain rights.” (citations omitted)); infra notes 345–46 and accompanying text 
(stating that the prosecutor’s and victim’s goals do not always align). 
153 Trans. Ill. Gen. Assemb., supra note 78, at 32.  The transcript reads: 
Last year, as we’re well aware, the Crime Victims’ Rights 
Constitutional Amendment passed with the approval of our citizens in 
the State of Illinois, and this bill is an attempt to codify, by enacting 
legislation, that constitutional amendment, so as to enforce the rights of 
the crime victims of our State. 
Id. at 32 (statement of State Sen. Cullerton) (emphasis added).  The plain meaning of 
“enforce” is “to make active or effective.”  Enforce Definition, MERRIAM-WEBSTER.COM, 
available at http://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/enforce (last visited Oct. 26, 
2014), archived at http://perma.cc/K8D-TPP5. 
154 Mulligan v. Joliet Reg’l Port Dist., 527 N.E.2d 1264, 1269 (Ill. 1988) (emphasis added); 
see also Illinois Nat’l Bank v. Chegin, 220 N.E.2d 226, 228 (Ill. 1966) (stating that the law 
Schlam: Enforcing Victim's Rights in Illinois:  The Rationale for Victim
Produced by The Berkeley Electronic Press, 2015
628 VALPARAISO UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 49 
“hardship”—time-consuming, resource-wasting, and far from a timely 
or meaningful remedy.155  Most likely, by the time equitable relief could 
be granted in a separate suit the original criminal prosecution will be 
concluded.  The victim would no longer have rights to enforce, which 
contradicts the statutory purpose to implement victims’ rights.156  
Therefore, victims would not be provided with a meaningful remedy 
through a separate “lawsuit.”  Effective and efficient remedies are better 
accomplished through motions or petitions filed by victims within the 
criminal prosecution, demands for relief that could be heard directly and 
immediately.157 
This better approach—direct victim participation—is suggested by 
analogy to other existing aspects of legal procedure.  In civil actions, for 
example, those who are initially nonparties are afforded the opportunity, 
if necessary, to present claims or defenses through the statutory device of 
intervention.158  Illinois’ law provides for both interventions as of right 
and permissive intervention.159  If obtained, intervention allows for the 
                                                                                                             
requires that a statute be given a reasonable interpretation according to the legislature’s 
intent, by looking to the meaning of the statute and the reasons for its enactment).  Further, 
“where the language of a statute admits of two constructions, one of which would make 
the enactment absurd, if not mischievous, while the other renders it reasonable and 
wholesome, the construction which leads to an absurd result will be avoided.”  Id.  
155 See, e.g., Myers v. Daley, 521 N.E.2d 98, 100 (Ill. App. Ct. 1987) (demonstrating a 
prohibitive burden is required of a victim). 
156 See In re D.F., 802 N.E.2d 800, 805 (Ill. 2003) (“A court, however, is not bound by the 
literal language of a statute that produces a result inconsistent with clearly expressed 
legislative intent, or that yields absurd or unjust consequences not contemplated by the 
legislature.”). 
157 See, e.g., Myers, 521 N.E.2d at 100 (indicating that relief under the Act would be 
“frustrated if victims were forced to file suit”); 725 ILL. COMP. STAT. 120/9 (2010) (“This Act 
does not limit any rights or responsibilities otherwise enjoyed by or imposed upon victims or 
witnesses of violent crime.” (emphasis added)); see also Kyl et al., supra note 19, at 616 
(arguing the importance of a victim’s right to be heard “at the very moment when their 
rights are at stake” and thus be free from unreasonable delay as to the right to intervene). 
158 735 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/2–408 (2010).  The state’s judiciary has a substantial history of 
implying causes of action from state statutes.  See, e.g., Sawyer Realty Group, Inc. v. Jarvis 
Corp., 432 N.E.2d 849, 852 (Ill. 1982) (stating that courts can imply a private cause of action 
for violation of the statute that provides no express remedy); Kelsay v. Motorola, Inc., 384 
N.E.2d 353, 357 (Ill. 1978) (implying a cause of action from the Workmen’s Compensation 
Act for retaliatory discharge); Boyer v. Atchison, Topeka and Santa Fe Ry. Co., 230 N.E.2d 
173, 176–77 (Ill. 1967) (implying a cause of action from the Federal Safety Appliance Act); 
Witt v. Forest Hosp., 450 N.E.2d 811, 813 (Ill. App. Ct. 1983) (implying a cause of action 
from the Guardianship and Advocacy Act); Sherman v. Field Clinic, 392 N.E.2d 154, 161 
(Ill. App. Ct. 1979) (implying a cause of action from the Illinois Collection Agency Act); 
Walinski v. Morrison & Morrison, 377 N.E.2d 242, 244 (Ill. App. Ct. 1978) (demonstrating a 
cause of action from Article I, Section 17 of the Illinois Constitution in situations where 
individuals are discriminated against during the employment process or in the sale or 
rental of real property on the basis of race, color, creed, national ancestry, or sex). 
159 735 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/2-408(a) (2010).  Intervention as of right is available: 
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disposal of entire controversies in a single lawsuit, thus avoiding 
separate re-litigation of related issues.160  Usually, intervention is allowed 
when necessary to protect the rights of the proposed intervenor; once 
allowed, the intervenor receives all the rights of an original party, except 
as justice and the avoidance of undue delay may require.161  Under the 
recently passed constitutional amendment, however, the “intervention” 
or participation would be limited solely to seeking relief for denied 
rights.  Therefore, this aspect of civil procedure—and its function—
supports the notion of direct victim participation in criminal 
prosecutions to vindicate their rights as a matter of efficiency and 
judicial economy. 
C. Implying Victims’ Standing in Criminal Prosecutions:  The Analogy of 
“Third Party” Intervention in Criminal Prosecutions 
Crime victims, it would seem, also meet the traditional criteria for 
personal standing and participation or “intervention” in criminal 
prosecutions.162  It would, therefore, be odd to conclude that victims 
                                                                                                             
(1) when a statute confers an unconditional right to intervene; or (2) 
when the representation of the [intervenor’s] interest by existing 
parties is or may be inadequate and the [intervenor] will or may be 
bound by an order or judgment in the action; or (3) when the 
[intervenor] is so situated as to be adversely affected by a distribution 
or other disposition of property in the custody or subject to the control 
or disposition of the court or a court officer. 
Id.  Permissive intervention is available “(1) when a statute confers a conditional right to 
intervene; or (2) when an [intervenor’s] claim or defense and the main action have a 
question of law or fact in common.”  Id. at 5/2-408(b).  Intervention is within the discretion 
of the court.  Id. 
160 735 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/2-408(a)–(b); see infra notes 171–72 and accompanying text 
(discussing how the presiding judge can address both criminal and civil suits involving 
related issues); People ex rel. Birkett v. City of Chicago, 779 N.E.2d 875, 887 (Ill. Ct. 2002) 
(discussing how the practice of intervention is liberalizing and avoids re-litigation of issues 
in a second suit). 
161 735 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/2-408(f) (2010) (emphasis added); City of Chicago v. Zik, 211 
N.E.2d 545, 546 (Ill. App. Ct. 1965) (allowing an applicant to intervene after judgment 
because the intervenor was unaware of the original suit until after judgment was entered).  
Illinois courts, however, liberally construe the intervention statute in favor of intervenors.  
See Bredberg v. City of Wheaton, 182 N.E.2d 742, 747–48 (Ill. 1962) (pointing out that 
intervention is desirable to allow a person the opportunity to protect an interest which is in 
jeopardy due to the pending litigation). 
162 See generally Valley Forge Christian Coll. v. Ams. United for Separation of Church and 
State, Inc., 454 U.S. 464, 474–76 (1982) (discussing with some clarity the various criteria for 
individual standing).  They would be making claims of direct injury in fact to the court 
which, though proximately caused by prosecutorial omission, could readily be redressed 
by the court; nor are they asserting a third party’s claim or “generalized grievances,” and 
they clearly fall within the “zone of interests” sought to be protected by the statute.  Id.  But 
see State v. Leingang, 763 N.W.2d 769, 774–75 (N.D. 2009) (holding that a victim cannot be 
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should in any way be denied the ability to directly enforce their statutory 
rights in this most effective manner.  Actually, there is recent precedent 
in at least one Illinois circuit court implying victim standing under these 
circumstances.163  There is also persuasive dictum from at least one other 
jurisdiction supporting such an implication; Connecticut, for example, 
has modeled its victims’ rights statute on Illinois’.164  In a fairly recent 
case construing Connecticut’s statute, State v. Gault, a victim filed an 
affidavit under seal in a criminal prosecution.165  The press wanted the 
redacted affidavit unsealed and the judge granted its motion.166  The 
victim sought to appeal the order, arguing that the statute implied that the 
victim had such a right.167  The Connecticut Supreme Court dismissed 
the appeal, holding that the victim had no standing to appeal because 
she was not legally a party: 
The state claims . . . that the victim’s rights amendment 
does not provide victims with party status.  It argues 
that the amendment, by its terms, delegates the 
authority for its enforcement to the General Assembly, 
and that body has not passed legislation providing for 
party status for crime victims or otherwise conveying a 
right to appeal.  We agree with the state.168 
However, in dicta, the court noted that the victim had never moved to 
intervene in the criminal case, thus suggesting that if she had initially 
sought to intervene, at least regarding her rights as a victim, she might 
have been a “party” eligible to file an appeal with regard to the 
unsealing of her affidavit.169 
Whether or not crime victims are “parties” to a criminal prosecution, 
they are certainly interested “third parties” with regard to the 
enforcement of their rights.  In Illinois, the procedural tool of 
intervention has been allowed in criminal proceedings if neither of the 
existing parties are protecting a third party’s constitutional rights.170  For 
                                                                                                             
given standing to challenge the district court’s termination of the defendant’s probation 
since this did not cause injury to the victim directly or imminently). 
163 People v. Johnson, 12 CF 76 (Dekalb Cnty., Ill. June 8, 2012) (granting standing and 
intervention in a criminal case to a victim). 
164 State v. Gault, 39 A.3d 1105, 1112 n.12 (Conn. 2012). 
165 Id. at 1107. 
166 Id. at 1109. 
167 Id. at 1107. 
168 Id. at 1110–11 (emphasis added). 
169 Id. at 1110, nn.9–10. 
170 See Klem v. Mann, 665 N.E.2d 514, 517 (Ill. App. Ct. 1996) (insurer sought to exercise a 
subrogation lien against a child's estate and did so with reasonable diligence in seeking 
Valparaiso University Law Review, Vol. 49, No. 3 [2015], Art. 7
https://scholar.valpo.edu/vulr/vol49/iss3/7
2015] Enforcing Victims’ Rights in Illinois 631 
example, in People v. Kelly, the court held that a petition to intervene, 
rather than a separate equitable action, was the appropriate vehicle for 
media assertions of First Amendment rights to access the criminal court 
proceedings.171  Public policy, the court noted, favors intervention over 
corollary litigation because the judge presiding over the criminal case is 
familiar with the facts and the defendant already has representation.172  
Illinois courts, therefore, already favor intervention over separate 
lawsuits as an appropriate vehicle to vindicate third parties as a matter 
of judicial economy.173  Similarly, it would seem most efficient for crime 
victims to assert and remedy the denial of their statutory rights by 
moving for specific relief, as necessary, as part of the prosecution of a 
criminal case. 
While a few states, such as Rhode Island, have held that permissive 
intervention “has no place in a criminal proceeding,” Illinois courts have 
repeatedly granted permissive intervention to third parties whose rights 
or interests require protection.174  News organizations, even in cases 
other than Kelly, have used intervention to vindicate violations of their 
constitutional right of access to judicial proceedings.175  Although, both 
                                                                                                             
intervention); see also In re Interest of K.P., 709 A.2d 315, 322 (N.J. Super. Ct. Ch. Div. 1997) 
(holding that, under New Jersey’s broad constitutional victims’ rights provision, a victim 
had standing and an unarticulated right to oppose a petition by the press to open a juvenile 
proceeding). 
171 People v. Kelly, 921 N.E.2d 333, 344, 349 (Ill. App. Ct. 2009); see People v. Pelo, 894 
N.E.2d 415, 416 (Ill. App. Ct. 2008) (affirming trial court’s grant of a newspaper’s petition to 
intervene for purpose of seeking its First Amendment right to access to a transcript and 
other court records in a criminal case; indeed, the Illinois legislature had codified that 
right); People v. LaGrone, 838 N.E.2d 142, 146 (Ill. App. Ct. 2005) (holding that media were 
allowed to intervene in a criminal case for the purpose of asserting constitutional right to 
access to the courts); In re Interest of K.P., 709 A.2d at 321 (finding that a victim has standing 
and an unarticulated right to oppose a petition by the press under New Jersey’s broad 
constitutional victims’ rights provision). 
172 Kelly, 921 N.E.2d at 345–46.  The judge presiding over the criminal case, being familiar 
with the facts, can retain the authority, and exercise due discretion, to make appropriate 
decisions regarding a victim’s rights as well.  The defendant already has criminal counsel 
and, from the point of view of all concerned, the matter is best kept out of civil courts.  Id. 
173 Pelo, 894 N.E.2d at 416. 
174 State v. Cianci, 496 A.2d 139, 146 (R.I. 1985); see Douglas E. Beloof, Constitutional 
Implications of Crime Victims as Participants, 88 CORNELL L. REV. 282, 285–86 (2003) 
(discussing the opinion that intervention is inappropriate because it is a civil procedure 
mechanism not fit for criminal trials and it violates the right of the criminal defendant to 
have a fair trial because defendant’s trial should not be interrupted by adjudication of third 
party interests that can later be brought as a civil matter).  However, in Illinois, courts 
allow third parties to intervene in criminal cases at the court's discretion, and thus this 
precedent is inapposite. 
175 See, e.g., Pelo, 894 N.E.2d at 416 (affirming a trial court’s grant of a newspaper’s 
petition to intervene for purpose of seeking its First Amendment right to access to a 
transcript and other court records in a criminal case); LaGrone, 838 N.E.2d at 143–45 
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the First Amendment and Section 4 of Article I of the Illinois 
Constitution grant the press a right of access to court records and 
criminal proceedings—and the Illinois General Assembly codified the 
public’s right of access—the right to intervene in criminal prosecutions is 
not unconditional.176  News organizations must still petition for 
permissive intervention to assert their “right of access.”177  Thus, if the 
members of the press have, as a matter of judicial discretion, properly 
been granted intervention in criminal cases to vindicate their rights, 
crime victims should also have standing to “intervene” to vindicate their 
unprotected statutory rights.178 
In conclusion, a reasonable interpretation of the Victims’ Rights Act 
already implied an independent right to file a separate suit in equity to 
enforce constitutional and statutory rights denied to victims in a criminal 
prosecution.  However, since such “lawsuits” would be inefficient and 
ineffective, few if any have been filed.  Nevertheless, by analogy to the 
general criteria and reasons for implying a cause of action under existing 
law, and to the justifications for allowing permissive intervention in 
criminal and civil practice, victim standing to seek redress for denied 
rights directly in criminal proceedings—even absent the recent 
amendment—would appear warranted.  This has been true in other 
states that, like Illinois, have not expressly authorized victim standing.  
Thus, passage of the “victims’ standing” constitutional amendment 
simply clarified and guaranteed what already may be implied from 
current law.  Indeed, other states without expressed victim standing 
have come to this conclusion, and have implied standing. 
                                                                                                             
(finding that intervention is the appropriate method for news organizations to assert their 
constitutional right to present public access issues); see also In re Interest of K.P., 709 A.2d at 
321 (stating that under New Jersey’s victims’ rights provision, a victim has standing and an 
unarticulated right to oppose a petition by the press to open a juvenile proceeding). 
176 705 ILL. COMP. STAT. 105/16(6) (2010); Kelly, 921 N.E.2d at 344.  In addition, there is a 
common law presumption recognized by the Supreme Court that allows the public to 
inspect and copy public records and documents, such as judicial records and documents.  
Kelly, 921 N.E.2d at 344; see U.S. CONST. amend. I (the right of freedom of religion, speech, 
press, assembly, and petition); ILL. CONST. art. I, § 4 (describing freedom of speech under 
the Illinois State Constitution); 705 ILL. COMP. STAT. 105/16(6) (2010) (explaining how the 
records of the court are maintained by the clerks and required by law to be public with all 
individuals having free access to inspect and examine them). 
177 See 735 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/2-408(b) (2010) (providing permissive intervention in the 
state of Illinois); Kelly, 921 N.E.2d at 344–46 (holding that the media’s use of a petition to 
intervene was the proper vehicle to seek access to sealed court proceedings and records in a 
criminal trial). 
178 See People v. Johnson, 12 CF at 76 (Dekalb Cnty., Ill.  June 8, 2012) (granting standing 
and intervention in a criminal case to a victim). 
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V.  IMPLYING STANDING IN STATES WITHOUT EXPRESSED VICTIM STANDING 
PROVISIONS:  JUDICIAL BALANCING OF INTERESTS 
State courts generally hold that victims, not being “parties” to 
criminal prosecutions, do not automatically have standing to challenge 
denial of their statutory rights or interests.179  This is even the case where 
states expressly provide for those rights in their constitution or laws.  
However, where victims assert implied standing in states with no 
express standing, the issue becomes the appropriate scope of the 
expressed right sought to be vindicated, and the reasonableness of the 
remedy sought.  In other words, in practice, denial of implied victim 
standing in those states occurs where there is an alleged conflict between 
the extent of the right sought by the victim and what are adjudged to be 
more important exercises of prosecutorial discretion, or where claims of 
an implied remedy for a denial of rights are, on balance, found to 
significantly interfere with a defendant’s due process rights. 
A. Denying Implied Standing:  Conflicts Between the Scope of the Victim’s 
Right Asserted and the Superior Need to Protect Prosecutorial Discretion 
Under existing victims’ rights provisions, victims ordinarily cannot 
challenge prosecutorial or judicial decisions.180  This is usually true 
where the relationship between the expressed right and the scope of the 
remedy sought is so attenuated as to be outweighed by a significant 
intrusion upon prosecutorial discretion.  For example, a victim’s “right to 
speak at sentencing” does not mean a victim may use the right in an effort 
to alter or dictate the terms of the sentence requested by the state.181  In 
                                                 
179 See, e.g., Cooper v. Dist. Ct., 133 P.3d 692, 695–714 (Alaska Ct. App. 2006) (rejecting 
various arguments that victim had standing to seek appellate review of sentencing error 
and her right to have part of a sentencing hearing sealed); Dix v. Superior Ct., 807 P.2d 
1063, 1067 (Cal. 1991) (finding that individual victims do not have standing to intervene in 
ongoing criminal cases); People v. Parriera, 46 Cal. Rptr. 835, 840 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 1965) 
(reasoning that the victim of the crime is not a party); see also Lamb v. Kontgias, 901 A.2d 
860, 864–69 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 2006) (holding victim was not party to criminal 
prosecution and did not have standing to appeal lack of notice and opportunity to speak at 
hearing to reconsider sentence); In re State ex rel. Sistrunk, 142 S.W.3d 497, 502–03 (Tex. Ct. 
App. 2004) (holding victim’s family had no standing to challenge defendant’s sentence or 
procedures at sentencing hearing); Commonwealth v. Malloy, 450 A.2d 689, 693 (Pa. Super. 
Ct. 1982) (finding criminal victim was not a party to criminal prosecution and did not have 
standing to appeal decision dismissing complaint). 
180 See, e.g., Gansz v. People, 888 P.2d 256, 257 (Colo. 1995) (holding that there is no victim 
statutory right to be heard at a hearing on a district attorney’s motion to dismiss criminal 
charges). 
181 See, e.g., Dix, 807 P.2d at 1067 (discussing how a crime victim sought to recall and 
resentence defendant for aggravated assault, the California Supreme Court reversed, 
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Cooper v. District Court, a victim sought to appeal her husband’s 
suspended sentence entered under a plea agreement and seal portions of 
the sentencing hearing.182  She was held not to have standing to do so 
under either the state constitutional amendment or the Victims’ Rights 
Act; her only expressed right was to have a “timely disposition,” which 
was satisfied.183  Also, victims’ demands for remedies for insufficient 
notice of hearings are usually rejected if the victim seeks to reopen pleas 
or sentences unless the trial court or the state has voluntarily chosen to 
do so, or important interests of the victim still have not been resolved.184 
An example of this latter exception is Ford v. State.185  The victim 
moved to declare a plea conference and agreement null and void because 
she only received four days’ notice of the hearing on the plea, alleging it 
eliminated her right to speak at sentencing.186  Insufficient notice to the 
victim, however, did not prevent the court from entering the plea 
agreement.187  Nevertheless, the court granted the victim’s petition to 
reopen the sentence limited to the question of restitution because the state 
conceded that, although restitution was a victim’s right, in this case it 
had been denied.188  There had, in fact, been an inappropriate 
distribution of funds among victims for which there would otherwise be 
no appellate remedy.189  Rights—such as restitution in a criminal 
disposition—are personal to the victim, cannot be waived, and a victim 
has no obligation to remain silent on this issue even if the state has 
agreed to do so pursuant to a plea agreement.190  Thus, given the 
cooperation of the state and the lack of interference with the defendant’s 
                                                                                                             
holding that the victim had no standing in the defendant’s criminal proceeding, that the 
victims’ rights statute provided a victim with no “resentencing power”). 
182 Cooper, 133 P.3d at 694–95 (concluding that the constitutional right of victim of 
domestic violence to a timely disposition of defendant’s case was satisfied notwithstanding 
victim’s claim that trial court failed to properly sentence defendant by not requiring him to 
attend a batterer’s intervention treatment program).  The victim’s rights were satisfied 
inasmuch as the sentencing took place in a timely manner, even if the appellate court were 
later to conclude that the proceedings were flawed.  Id. at 694. 
183 Id. at 700–01. 
184 State v. Casey, 44 P.3d 756, 757–58 (Utah 2002) (explaining how a victim filed a motion 
to reject a plea bargain and the trial court informally reopened the plea hearing to accept 
the victim’s testimony, that of his mother, permitted argument from the victim's counsel, 
and then reaffirmed the plea that any violation of the victim’s rights was cured). 
185 Ford v. State, 829 So.2d 946, 947–48 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2002). 
186 Id. at 947. 
187 Id. 
188 Id. at 948. 
189 Id. 
190 State v. Robinson, No. C1–02–1957, 2003 WL 21694412, at *3 (Minn. Ct. App. 2003).  
On the other hand, a victim’s failure to assert a right to restitution within a reasonable time 
will constitute a waiver of that right.  In re Alton D., 994 P.2d 402, 406 (Ariz. 2000). 
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expectations, the court allowed the victim standing limited to recovering 
losses resulting from an admittedly denied right that would otherwise 
not be remedied.191 
On the other hand, courts have more difficulty providing remedies 
where the requested remedy interferes with prosecutorial discretion or a 
defendant’s rights to a fair trial.  Thus, a victim’s right to “confer with the 
prosecutor”—even coupled with her broad right to “fairness” articulated 
in the same statute—does not grant her the right to discover evidence in 
a prosecutor’s criminal file to facilitate her civil suit.192  Nor does a 
victim’s right to be present at all crucial stages of criminal proceedings 
imply standing to join the prosecutor at the counsel table.193  Such 
allegedly implied “rights” are too tenuously related to—or are much 
broader than—the expressed rights and, perhaps more importantly, 
interfere with either prosecutorial discretion or defendants’ rights.  
While a victim’s presence at the counsel table may allow the victim and 
the prosecution to confer—perhaps adding to the truth-finding process—
a certification by the prosecutor of this necessity rather than an assertion 
of an implied victim’s right to do so is the only basis for such a 
privilege.194  Thus, without express standing, it seems fair to assume 
courts will most likely imply victim standing only when it is essential to 
accomplish justice, or when the scope of the victim’s asserted right is 
consistent with the rationale for the right. 
B. Denying Implied Standing:  Conflicts Between a Victim’s View of the 
Scope of Her Rights and a Defendant’s Due Process Rights 
Under somewhat similar facts, in State v. Harrison, the court held that 
where a trial court permitted a victim's advocate to sit near the victim 
while she testified and allowed a guardian ad litem to sit at the state’s 
counsel table and question witnesses, such a "team prosecution" was 
                                                 
191 Ford, 829 So.2d at 948 n.1 (citing United States v. DiFrancesco, 449 U.S. 117, 139, 143 
(1980)) (finding that “a federal statute allowing the government to appeal a sentence on the 
ground that it is too lenient does not violate federal double jeopardy . . . [as] a sentence is 
not accorded the same finality, under federal double jeopardy principles, as an acquittal”). 
192 State ex rel. Hilbig v. McDonald, 839 S.W.2d 854, 856 (Tex. Ct. App. 1992) (deciding 
that in promulgating the constitutional amendment and statute on crime victims’ rights, 
the legislature did not intend for crime victims to have a right to discover material within 
the prosecutor’s file in a pending criminal matter). 
193 See State v. Harrison, 24 P.3d 936, 945–47 (Utah 2001) (concluding that allowing a 
“team prosecution” was plain error and inherently prejudicial by allowing the guardian ad 
litem to sit at the counsel table and question witnesses during trial). 
194 See Crowe v. State, 485 So. 2d 351, 362–63 (Ala. Crim. App. 1984) (holding that victims 
may sit at the counsel table upon a showing by the prosecutor that the victim will be of 
material assistance); Hall v. State, 579 So. 2d 329, 330 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1991) (determining 
that victims may sit at the counsel table to assist the prosecution). 
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plain error and inherently prejudicial to the defendant.195  In other 
prosecutions as well, judicial failures to imply standing where it would 
unreasonably expand the scope of victim rights are frequently sustained 
where this would interfere with defendants’ rights.  In State v. Gonzales, 
for example, the court held that a victim’s constitutional “right to be 
treated with fairness and respect for [her] dignity and privacy” did not 
negate a court order allowing the defense to inquire into the victim's use 
of alcohol for the purpose of impeachment.196  Doing so would deprive 
the defendant of his right to confrontation.197  The scope of the victim’s 
right to “fairness” cannot be expanded to destroy the defendant’s right 
to a “fair” trial. 
Efforts in Illinois to “expand” the scope of expressed victims’ rights 
and enforce those rights are largely given similar treatment.  Courts will 
analyze whether claimed victim’s rights—as enforced or sought to be 
enforced—significantly interfere with a defendant’s rights.  In People v. 
Richardson, for instance, a defendant sentenced to consecutive prison 
terms sought a new sentencing hearing.198  He claimed the state’s 
presentation of three written “victim-impact statements” at sentencing, 
instead of the one permitted under the plain language of the Rights of 
Crime Victims and Witnesses Act, prejudiced his trial.199  The Illinois 
Supreme Court held that while the circuit court erred in admitting and 
considering multiple statements, there was no evidence the statements 
unduly prejudiced the defendant’s trial or the sentencing hearing was 
rendered fundamentally unfair.200  Thus, even the technical “over-
exercise” of a victim’s right was sustained in the absence of any 
significant infringement of a defendant’s rights. 
                                                 
195 Harrison, 24 P.3d at 945, 947. 
196 State v. Gonzales, 912 P.2d 297, 299–300 (N.M. Ct. App. 1996). 
197 Id. at 299. 
198 People v. Richardson, 751 N.E.2d 1104, 1106 (Ill. 2001). 
199 Id.; 725 ILL. COMP. STAT. 120/1-9 (2010). 
200 Richardson, 751 N.E.2d at 1109; see People v. Willis, 569 N.E.2d 113, 117 (Ill. App. Ct.) 
(holding any error in allowing manslaughter victim's cousin, who was outside of statutory 
definition of “victim,” to address court regarding impact which defendant's criminal 
conduct had upon victim was harmless); People v. Gonzales, 673 N.E.2d 1181, 1183 (Ill. 
App. Ct. 1996) (discussing the trial court's alleged error in considering two victim impact 
statements in sentencing murder defendant, despite provision in Rights of Crime Victims 
and Witnesses Act defining victim as single representative of person killed, was waived 
where defense counsel failed to object to consideration of impact statements, as error did 
not rise to level of plain error). 
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C. Jurisdictions That Have Implied Victims’ Standing to Vindicate Denial of 
Expressed Rights Where There was no Interference with Defendants’ 
Rights 
A few states imply victim standing to enforce expressed rights, but 
only where remedies would not conflict with prosecutorial discretion or 
the rights of defendants.  At the time of the decision in State v. 
Timmendequas, for example, New Jersey had a “victims’ rights” 
constitutional amendment and enabling statute quite similar to those in 
Illinois.201  The New Jersey Constitution provided, inter alia, that “[a] 
victim of a crime shall be treated with fairness, compassion and respect 
by the criminal justice system.”202  The state Supreme Court held that the 
constitutional language, coupled with a victim’s right to be present at 
public judicial proceedings without significant inconvenience, gave the 
victim standing to seek and obtain the empanelling of a foreign jury 
rather than allowing defendant a change of venue.203  The victim’s right 
to convenient participation was respected in the absence of any 
interference with the defendant’s right to a fair trial.204 
In State of New Jersey in the Interest of K.P., the same court held that 
the right to make a statement during the dispositional phase of the trial 
would be useless and inconsistent with legislative intent without an 
implication of standing in the victim to vindicate the right.205  After all, 
the courts have the power to prevent a miscarriage of justice, they are the 
guardian of rights, and requests for standing to obtain relief are “in pari 
materia with the fundamental [constitutional] right to be treated with 
fairness, compassion, and respect by the criminal justice system.”206  
Those latter terms, said the court, make a victim “a constructive 
equivalent to a party in the case[,]” modifying the traditional state-
defendant paradigm, at least to the extent necessary to enforce victims’ 
                                                 
201 State v. Timmendequas, 737 A.2d 55, 75–76 (N.J. 1999). 
202 N.J. CONST. art. I, § 22. 
203 Id.; Timmendequas, 737 A.2d at 76 (finding the decision not to change venue, but to 
empanel foreign jury, did not violate the defendant's constitutional rights since the Victim's 
Rights Amendment entitled the parents to fairness and respect, and a provision of the 
Crime Victim's Bill of Rights required a minimization of inconveniences).  But see State v. 
Rymer, No. 99-1521-CR, 2000 WL 1855147, at *5 (Wis. Ct. App. 2000) (declining to rely on 
broad victims’ rights provisions to give the victim an interest in change of venue 
proceeding) (cited in Douglas E. Beloof, The Third Wave of Crime Victims’ Rights:  Standing, 
Remedy, and Review, 2005 BYU L. REV. 255, 264). 
204 Timmendequas, 737 A.2d at 76. 
205 In re the Interest of K.P., 709 A.2d 315, 321 (N.J.  Super. Ct. Ch. Div. 1997).  
206 Id. at 321, 323. 
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rights.207  To rule otherwise would change a victim’s right into a 
nullity.208 
The constitutions of Arizona and Utah also mandate that victims be 
treated with respect and dignity, including the right to refuse to allow 
intrusions into private matters.209  In State ex rel. Romley v. Hutt, the 
Arizona court denied a defendant's motion to record the interactions 
between the victim and the prosecutor, holding that such an intrusion 
would create an atmosphere hostile to the intent of the constitutional 
provision with regard to victims’ rights.210  The victims’ right to refuse to 
be interviewed by the defendant implied victim standing to move to 
preclude the requested “recording,” especially where such a ruling did 
not implicate the defendant’s right to a fair trial.211  The Florida 
constitution, as well, contains similar “fairness” language and allows 
victims a right to be heard.212  In Ford v. State, the court granted a victim’s 
petition for a writ of certiorari based on the allegation that the state had 
not provided adequate notice, causing the victim to forgo restitution.213  
It held that those rights implied a right to standing to seek relief with 
respect to restitution.214  But here again, allowing standing did not 
conflict with the rights of the defendant since double jeopardy is not 
violated where a trial court merely increases a sentence to include 
restitution.215 
Finally, even before their relatively recent passage of a constitutional 
“standing amendment,” California courts also interpreted their victims' 
rights provisions as implying victim standing.216  In Melissa J. v. Superior 
Court, the court granted a victim's petition for a writ of mandamus 
because the trial court had ruled in favor of a defendant's post-sentencing 
motion to terminate restitution without affording the victim notice and 
                                                 
207 Id. at 320–21. 
208 Id. at 324.  Specifically, if paragraph 22 of Article I of the New Jersey Constitution 
cannot be construed to grant standing to victims, then the constitutional amendment lacks 
meaning: “the people of New Jersey amended their constitution to grant the legislature 
power it already possessed.”  Id. 
209 ARIZ. CONST. art. 2 § 2.1(1); UTAH CONST. art. I, § 28(a). 
210 State ex rel. Romley v. Hutt, 987 P.2d 218, 223 (Ariz. App. Ct. 1999). 
211 Id. at 223. 
212 FLA. CONST. art. I, § 16(b). 
213 Ford v. State, 829 So.2d 946, 948 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2002); see Interest of K.P., 709 A.2d 
at 320 (discussing decision in the context of an exception to the general rule of lack of 
standing where notice was not given prior to a hearing on distribution of restitution, 
restitution being a victim’s right, and therefore the sentence should have been reopened in 
all fairness to correct a not otherwise remedial error). 
214 Ford, 829 So. 2d at 948. 
215 Id. 
216 CA. CONST. art. I, § 28(b). 
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opportunity to be heard.217  The court distinguished People v. Superior 
Court (Thompson), holding that lack of notice at the original sentencing 
hearing did not deprive the trial court of the power to proceed, whereas in 
Melissa, the absence of notice occurred during a hearing on a post-
sentencing motion to terminate restitution, which was invalid without prior 
notice to the victim and opportunity for her to be heard.218 
In conclusion, fifteen states, including Illinois, have constitutional 
language granting victims’ rights through language similar to what is 
discussed in this section.219  Eight other states have similar statutory 
language executing the constitutional amendment.220  The Illinois statute, 
like others, expressly grants victims “[t]he right to be treated with 
fairness and respect for their dignity and privacy throughout the 
criminal justice process.”221  In several of these states, courts have 
implied victim’s standing to vindicate denial of an expressed right, at 
least in the absence of interference with the rights of the state or the 
defendant.222  The same reasoning would support a similar interpretation 
                                                 
217 Melissa J. v. Superior Court, 237 Cal. Rptr. 5, 5–7 (Cal. Ct. App. 1987). 
218 Id. at 6; see People v. Superior Court (Thompson), 202 Cal. Rptr. 585, 586–87 (Cal. Ct. 
App. 1984) (discussing that the People and victim of a battery that took place on a school 
campus separately petitioned for a writ of mandate and/or prohibition alleging that the 
order of the Superior Court sentencing the defendant, who had been convicted of 
committing the battery, to probation was unlawful in that victim was not notified of the 
sentencing date).  The Court of Appeals held that the trial court had jurisdiction to proceed 
with the sentencing even though victim had not been notified of the date and, as a result, 
did not appear.  Id. 
219 ARIZ. CONST. art. II, § 2.1; IDAHO CONST. art. I, § 22; ILL. CONST. art. I, § 8.1; IND. 
CONST. art. I, § 13(b); LA. CONST. art. I, § 25; MICH. CONST. art. I, § 24; MISS. CONST. art. III, 
§ 26A; N.J. CONST. art. I, § 22; N.M. CONST. art. II, § 24; OHIO CONST. art. I, § 10a; OKLA. 
CONST. art. II, § 34; S.C. CONST. art. I, § 24; TEX. CONST. art. I, § 30; UTAH CONST. art. I, § 28; 
VA. CONST. art I, § 8-A. 
220 IDAHO CODE ANN. § 19-5306 (2004); 725 ILL. COMP. STAT. 120/2 (2010); IND. CODE § 35-
40-5-1 (2008); MISS. CODE ANN. § 99-43-1 (2000); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 31-26-2 (2009); S.C. 
CODE ANN. § 16-3-1505 (2003); UTAH CODE ANN. § 77-37-1 (LexisNexis 2012); VA. CODE 
ANN. § 19.2-11.01 (LexisNexis 2008). 
221 725 ILL. COMP. STAT. 120/4(a)(1) (2010). 
222 See In re Interest of K.P., 709 A.2d 315, 320 (N.J. 1997) (considering the legislature’s 
intent).  The court reasoned: 
It is difficult for the court to imagine that the Legislature intended to 
give victims these expansive rights, yet specifically intended that they 
should not be a factor for a court to consider when there is compelling 
evidence that a detrimental effect upon a victim will occur if the court 
ignored their request.  The State contends that the Legislature 
specifically identified victims to be considered an interested party with 
standing to open a proceeding, and, therefore, the court should 
determine that the ability to open suggests standing to close.  The court 
agrees.  The court finds that the legislative intent is more in line with 
considering the victim's position as opposed to ignoring it.  The court 
finds a victim is a constructive equivalent to a party in the case. 
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of the victims’ rights laws in Illinois.223  Indeed, it might be helpful to ask 
whether there has been any interference with the administration of 
criminal justice, or the rights of defendants, in jurisdictions that have 
expressly allowed for victim standing. 
VI.  THE EXPERIENCE IN JURISDICTIONS THAT EXPRESSLY ALLOW VICTIM 
STANDING IN THEIR CONSTITUTIONS OR STATUTES:  SELECTED ASSERTIONS 
OF SELECTED VICTIM RIGHTS 
Several jurisdictions have expressly provided victims standing to 
vindicate rights in their state constitutions and laws.  New Jersey 
amended its state constitution to provide for victims’ rights around the 
same time as did Illinois, and initially did not expressly provide for 
victim standing to enforce their rights.224  Recently, however, New Jersey 
voters gave crime victims standing for this purpose, and for the same 
reasons as those leading to recent, successful legislative initiatives for 
similar changes in Illinois.225  In addition, two states had earlier granted 
similar standing to victims through constitutional amendments—Oregon 
and California in 2008.226  The Federal Crime Victim’s Rights Act of 2004, 
which inspired this trend, explicitly allows a victim to bring motions in 
the district court for relief from denial of rights wherever the criminal 
proceedings are being held, and to seek mandamus from the appellate 
                                                                                                             
Id. 
223 725 ILL. COMP. STAT. 120/4(a)(1) (2010) (providing “[t]he right to be treated with 
fairness and respect for their dignity and privacy throughout the criminal justice 
process . . .”).  As an aside, therefore, Section 8.1(d) of the Illinois constitution, stating that 
victims’ rights do not create a basis for a defendant to vacate a conviction, need not be read 
as prohibiting the implication of standing and intervention of the victim to move to reopen 
and renegotiate a conviction to vindicate unfulfilled rights.  ILL. CONST. art. I, § 8.1. 
224 See supra notes 202–03 (providing the language of New Jersey’s Constitution and the 
state’s leading case on the issue). 
225 N.J. STAT. ANN. § 52:4B-36 (2012) (declaring that a crime victim has the right “[t]o 
appear in any court before which a proceeding implicating the rights of the victim is being 
held, with standing to file a motion or present argument on a motion filed to enforce any 
right conferred herein or by Article I, paragraph 22 of the New Jersey Constitution, and to 
receive an adjudicative decision by the court on any such motion”); Angela Delli Santi, NJ 
Gov. Christie Signs Law Aiding Crime Victims, NORTH JERSEY.COM (Aug. 7, 2012, 6:54 P.M.), 
available at http://www.northjersey.com/news/crime-and-courts/nj-gov-christie-signs-
law-aiding-crime-victims-1.479127, archived at http://perma.cc/83QC-P7MV.  (“It literally 
addresses most of the issues victims have had problems with over the past [twenty] years 
and provides remedies in those areas . . . [f]or example, victims never had direct standing 
to come into criminal court and assert their rights.  Now they do.”); Press release, Illinois 
Attorney General, Senate Vote Puts Crime Victim’s Rights Amendment on November 
Ballot (Apr. 10, 2014), available at http://www.ag.state.il.us/pressroom/2014_04/ 
20140410.html, archived at http://perma.cc/D75G-Y3UZ. 
226 CA. CONST. art. I, § 28(b); OR. CONST. art. I, §§ 42, 43. 
Valparaiso University Law Review, Vol. 49, No. 3 [2015], Art. 7
https://scholar.valpo.edu/vulr/vol49/iss3/7
2015] Enforcing Victims’ Rights in Illinois 641 
court to compel the district court to act should it refuse to provide 
relief.227  Numerous states have allowed for victim standing by statute.228 
Now that sufficient time has passed, and a significant number of 
victims’ rights claims have been adjudicated, it would seem useful and 
illuminating to review the practical experience in those jurisdictions.  
This section discusses the application of a few of the common victims’ 
rights provisions. Concerning each right, it examines how courts have 
resolved questions of defendants’ due process rights arguably denied, or 
aspects of prosecutorial discretion allegedly impeded.  Hopefully, this 
will provide some insight into the extent to which victim standing has in 
fact interfered with the due administration of criminal justice.  
A.  The Right to Restitution 
The statutory right to restitution requires that a victim is entitled to 
be made whole as a result of a loss imposed by the defendant.229  Yet, 
claims for restitution are occasionally alleged to conflict with a variety of 
defendant’s rights, such as the rights to be free from double jeopardy, to 
be guaranteed due process of law, or to be free from ex post facto laws.  In 
People v. Harvest, for example, a defendant was convicted of first and 
second-degree murder and was sentenced to a term of years.230  
However, the Court of Appeals reversed the second-degree murder 
conviction and ordered the prosecution to either retry that charge or 
reduce it to voluntary manslaughter.231  The state elected not to retry the 
charge, but upon resentencing for voluntary manslaughter—and for the 
first time—the trial court ordered restitution.232  The defendant argued 
on appeal that he had twice been placed in jeopardy, making the 
restitution award unconstitutional.233 
The high court disagreed, holding that a victim restitution order was 
not punishment for double jeopardy purposes, and that nothing 
prevented the government from seeking restitution for the first time at 
                                                 
227 18 U.S.C. § 3771(d)(3)–(4) (2006).  In addition, a federal prosecutor can allege that the 
district court's erroneous deprivation of a victim’s rights to notice and to be heard is 
reversible error.  Id. 
228 See, e.g., CAL. GOV’T CODE § 6276.01 (West 2008); MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 780.751 
(West 2007). 
229 CAL. PENAL CODE § 1202.4 (West 2004). 
230 People v. Harvest, 101 Cal. Rptr. 2d 135, 137 (Cal. Ct. App. 2000). 
231 Id. 
232 Id. 
233 Id. 
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resentencing.234  Restitution is compensation, which does not involve an 
affirmative disability or restraint, and thus historically has not been 
regarded as punishment.235  While victim restitution in the context of a 
criminal sentencing, of course, follows from a finding of “a criminal 
mind,” this would not preclude a victim from obtaining essentially the 
same relief—a civil judgment for money—outside of the criminal 
process.236 
Similarly, in another California case, a defendant pled guilty to auto 
theft.237  He received a suspended sentence and probation, which 
included a condition of victim restitution.238  The trial court ultimately 
revoked probation, ordered service of a previously imposed sentence of 
incarceration, and modified the sentencing order to require payment of 
restitution not paid during the term of the now revoked probation.239  On 
appeal, the defendant argued that by modifying his sentence the court 
increased his punishment in violation of double jeopardy provisions.240  
The appellate court held that a sentencing court could modify a 
suspended sentence to impose restitution—even if that was not part of 
the original sentence—and that such an order did not “increase 
punishment” in violation of double jeopardy.241  The clear legislative 
intent was that restitution be imposed in all cases unless “compelling 
and extraordinary reasons exist to the contrary.”242  No such reasons 
existed in this prosecution.243 
At issue in People v. Lyon was an alleged conflict between a victim’s 
right to restitution and a defendant’s due process right to effective 
counsel.244  In that case, a defendant found guilty of embezzlement was 
sentenced to five years in prison and was ordered to make victim 
restitution, including the victim’s attorney fees.245  The defendant 
appealed, arguing that paying attorney’s fees as restitution would 
interfere with his right to prepare and present a defense; it would place 
an undue burden on counsel's efforts and obligation to provide effective 
                                                 
234 Id. at 141.  Doctrines of waiver, estoppel, and laches were irrelevant.  Id.  While 
estoppel may be invoked against the government, it will not defeat a strong public policy 
such as the constitutional mandate for victim restitution.  Harvest, 101 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 142. 
235 Id. at 140. 
236 Id. at 138. 
237 People v. Young, 45 Cal. Rptr. 2d 177, 178 (1995). 
238 Id. 
239 Id. at 178–79. 
240 Id. at 179. 
241 Id. at 182. 
242 Id. at 179. 
243 Young, 45 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 182. 
244 People v. Lyon, 57 Cal. Rptr. 2d 415, 417 (1996). 
245 Id. at 416. 
Valparaiso University Law Review, Vol. 49, No. 3 [2015], Art. 7
https://scholar.valpo.edu/vulr/vol49/iss3/7
2015] Enforcing Victims’ Rights in Illinois 643 
representation.246  Balancing interests, the court held that the order 
providing for payment of victims’ legal expenses must be set aside.247  
Knowledge by defense counsel that the client, if convicted, could be 
charged with these costs would adversely affect the manner, extent, and 
degree of counsel’s preparation, and thus “have a chilling effect on the 
exercise of [the defendant’s] constitutional right[s].”248 
The defendant’s constitutional right to be free from ex post facto laws 
was at issue in State v. Clark.249  Clark involved a victim’s appeal from a 
criminal restitution order, an appeal in which neither the defendant nor 
the prosecution participated.250  The trial court required payment for the 
therapy of a minor victim who had been sexually abused.251  Since the 
defendant was also sentenced to prison, he had no means to pay those 
costs.252  However, since the defendant—who was also a minor—had 
been adopted through DCFS, the minor victim requested that DCFS be 
ordered to pay the treatment costs.253  The trial court declined to issue 
such an order, holding, inter alia, that allowing the appeal would be an ex 
post facto law punishing the State.254 
B. The Right to be Notified of all Stages of the Judicial Process 
The defendant’s right to have the state honor a plea bargain was at 
issue in State v. Means.255  A plea agreement was set aside after the 
prosecutor notified the court that he had not informed the victim before 
the hearing on the plea.256  The defendant then entered into a second plea 
agreement with the State, but it was less favorable to him.257  On appeal, 
the defendant argued that once an agreement is reached and the 
defendant pleads guilty “due process concerns . . . inhibit the ability of 
the prosecutor to withdraw from a guilty plea.”258  Prosecutors, he 
claimed, should not be able to circumvent a plea agreement where a 
defendant has voluntarily and knowingly waived his jury right, the right 
to counsel, and the right to cross-examine witnesses.259  The court agreed, 
                                                 
246 Id. at 416–17. 
247 Id. at 418. 
248 Id. at 417. 
249 State v. Clark, 251 P.3d 829, 833 (Utah 2011). 
250 Id. at 831. 
251 Id. 
252 Id. 
253 Id. 
254 See id. (refusing to issue the order absent exceptions). 
255 State v. Means, 926 A.2d 328, 333 (N.J. 2007). 
256 Id. at 329. 
257 Id. at 329, 331 (illustrating the first and second plea agreements). 
258 Id. at 333. 
259 Id. 
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concluding that while a trial court is obliged to protect a victims’ right to 
notice, that right may not be used to impinge on a defendant’s 
constitutional rights.260  The lower court should have heard from the 
victims on the second plea agreement.261  Had it done so, it would have 
been in a better position to decide whether to accept or reject the second 
agreement, and the second plea would have been sustained.262 
Another interesting case, again presenting arguments of violations of 
double jeopardy but suggesting a superior judicial approach to accepting 
plea agreements, was State v. Casey, where a defendant charged with 
felony aggravated sexual abuse of a child had pled not guilty.263  The 
prosecution offered to reduce the charges to a misdemeanor in exchange 
for a guilty plea.264  The victim had previously told the prosecutor she 
did not want the charges reduced, but the prosecution never informed 
the court of her statement.265  At the “change of plea hearing” the plea to 
the misdemeanor was accepted and the finding of guilty was entered.266  
After the victim asked to speak at sentencing on the misdemeanor the 
trial court briefly re-opened the plea, considered what the victim had 
said, and then re-affirmed and entered the prior plea agreement.267  The 
appellate court held that a victim may deliver a request to be heard at a 
change of plea hearing, and that request must be conveyed to the court; 
nevertheless, here the trial court had remedied the violation by allowing 
the victim to speak at re-sentencing.268  There was little if any delay or 
impediment in this prosecution.269 
Double jeopardy claims were at issue again in State v. Barrett, where 
a defendant pled guilty to stalking.270  He was sentenced without the 
                                                 
260 Id. at 334. 
261 Means, 926 A.2d at 335. 
262 Id. at 335.  But see Reed v. Becka, 511 S.E.2d 396, 400 (S.C. Ct. App. 1999) (disregarding 
victims input).  The state moved to withdraw a plea offer made to a defendant.  Id. at 398.  
The trial court denied the motion and both the state and the victim's parents appealed.  Id.  
The defendant claimed he detrimentally relied on the proposed plea agreement but the 
victim argued that she was entitled to consult with the prosecutor and “be informed of any 
offers to plea bargain” before a plea is entered.  Id. at 400 (emphasis added).  The court held 
that victims do not have a right to veto a plea agreement and, in any event, that the state 
may withdraw a plea offer without victim consent.  Id.  That is, although victims must be 
notified of plea offers, that right does not extend to allowing them to reject a proposed offer 
or, for that matter, force a prosecutor to trial or back into negotiations.  Id. 
263 State v. Casey, 44 P.3d 756, 757 (Utah 2002). 
264 Id. 
265 Id. at 758. 
266 Id. at 758–59. 
267 Id. at 758. 
268 Id. at 767. 
269 Casey, 44 P.3d at 762. 
270 State v. Barrett, 255 P.3d 472, 476 (Or. 2011). 
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victim being notified of the hearing date.271  The victim petitioned for re-
sentencing because the Oregon Constitutional requirement that she be 
notified of and be present at sentencing hearings was not met.272  
However, the defendant claimed that resentencing would violate his 
double jeopardy rights.273  The trial court recognized that the victim’s 
constitutional rights had been violated, but found there was no 
remedy.274  The Oregon Supreme Court ruled that the trial court could 
resentence as a remedy for the violation of victims’ constitutional rights 
because criminal sentencing is “a ruling of a court” as opposed to a 
“conviction” or “adjudication.”275  Thus, vacating defendant's sentence 
and ordering a resentencing would not be inconsistent with the right to 
be free from double jeopardy.276 
Similarly, in Hoile v. State, a victim was not notified of a hearing to 
reconsider the sentence of her assailant.277  She sought to vacate the 
altered sentence on these grounds.278  The trial court granted her request 
and the defendant appealed.279  In Maryland, a victim may file an 
application for leave to appeal in criminal litigation, but she does not 
have a right to appeal unless the decision appealed from substantially 
affected her direct interests.280  Here, the assault victim was held entitled 
to participate fully in briefing and oral argument because resolution of 
the appeal on the merits would affect her direct and substantial 
constitutional interests—her statutory rights to be notified, attend, and 
be heard at reconsideration hearings.281  There was no impediment to the 
defendant’s rights.282 
In Ex parte Littlefield, the state’s interest in preserving prosecutorial 
discretion was at stake.283  Victims of white collar crimes petitioned for a 
writ of mandamus setting aside the guilty plea of a perpetrator with 
respect to offenses he committed against several victims because the 
                                                 
271 Id. 
272 Id. 
273 Id. 
274 Id. at 474. 
275 Id. at 479. 
276 Barrett, 255 P.3d at 481. 
277 948 A.2d 30, 35 (Md. 2008). 
278 Id. at 36. 
279 Id. 
280 See id. at 39 (interpreting Maryland’s declaration of rights and State statutes). 
281 Id. at 42.  However, the victim was not entitled to relief in the case because the 
legislature had not permitted a victim to seek invalidation of an otherwise legal sentence 
merely because the victim’s rights concerning imposition of that sentence had been 
violated.  Id. at 52. 
282 Hoile, 948 A.2d at 44–45. 
283 Ex parte Littlefield, 540 S.E.2d 81, 84 (S.C. 2000). 
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petitioning victims, who were not involved in the instant plea, were not 
heard on the plea bargain that included only some of the victims.284  The 
state argued that if the statutory rights of victims were interpreted to 
include every victim of a perpetrator—even those victims’ cases not 
prosecuted or part of a plea agreement—prosecutors would suffer an 
enormous burden of notification.285  Since the offenses against the 
petitioning victims were not included within the guilty plea agreement, 
the court held, they were not “victims” with rights to notice and 
attendance at the plea bargain hearing.286  Prosecutorial discretion was 
sustained against an overly expansive view of the right to be heard.287 
C. The Right to be Present at all Stages of the Judicial Process 
The defendant’s right to sequester or exclude witnesses before trial 
was at issue in State v. Beltran-Felix.288  The prosecutor informed the court 
that the victim, who was to testify, wished to be present during the entire 
trial.289  The defendant objected, but the court overruled the objection.290  
The victim remained in the courtroom throughout the trial and the jury 
returned a guilty verdict.291  On appeal, the court held that a rape victim 
may remain in the courtroom throughout the trial, and that a defendant 
has no constitutional right to the exclusion or sequestration of witnesses 
unless, under particular circumstances—such as with a disruptive 
witness—the court finds that the victim’s presence may deprive a 
defendant of a fair trial.292 
                                                 
284 Id. at 84–85. 
285 Id. at 85. 
286 Id. at 86.  But see In re Dean, 527 F.3d 391, 392 (5th Cir. 2008) (recognizing victims have 
the right to be a part of the plea agreement).  The government told the court in an ex parte 
proceeding that it was going to sign a plea agreement with the defendant, and asserted that 
due to the number of victims, it would not be practicable to consult with them.  Id.  The 
government argued that notifying the victims would result in extensive media coverage, 
which would impair the plea negotiation process and possibly prejudice the case if no plea 
was reached.  Id.  Some of the victims objected to the plea agreement, but the court agreed 
with the government's argument, and directed the government to notify all the victims after 
the plea agreement had been finalized.  Id. at 393.  However, on appeal, the court reversed, 
and held that the CVRA gave victims the right to confer with prosecutors during the plea 
negotiation process, before a plea agreement was reached, and the number of victims did 
not render notice to, or conferring with, the victims to be impracticable.  Id. at 394–95 
(citations omitted). 
287 Ex parte Littlefield, 540 S.E.2d 81, 87 (S.C. 2000). 
288 State v. Beltran-Felix, 922 P.2d 30, 32 (Utah Ct. App. 1996). 
289 Id. 
290 Id. 
291 Id. 
292 Id. at 34. 
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In another case concerning the right to be present, Morehart v. Barton, 
a trial court granted the defendant’s motion for an ex parte hearing, but 
excluded the prosecution and victim under a state procedural rule that 
authorizes their exclusion for certain matters.293  The intent of the ex parte 
motion was to address the lack of return of summonses issued as part of 
defense counsel's pretrial investigation of mitigation evidence, a motion 
opposed by the victim who claimed a right to confidentiality.294  The 
murdered victim’s family argued that they were entitled to attend the 
hearing because defendant’s counsel would be present.295  The Arizona 
Supreme Court held that although victims may have “various rights to 
participate in court proceedings that are independent of the defendant’s 
right to be present[,]” the family had no constitutional right to attend ex 
parte hearings concerning purely procedural matters—whether or not 
defense counsel will appear.296  Thus, the court refused to expand the 
alleged scope of the victim’s right under these circumstances.297 
D. The Right to Offer Victim Impact Statements 
In State v. Muhammad, a defendant argued that the “victim impact 
statute” violated the provision of the New Jersey Constitution that 
prohibited the infliction of cruel and unusual punishment.298  Defendant 
argued that the admission of such statements in a capital case, would 
likely confuse and “impassion” the jury during sentencing, and thus the 
penalty decision would be made in an arbitrary and capricious manner, 
rather than on the basis of relevant evidence.299  However, the State 
contended that this evidence was relevant because it illustrates each 
victim's uniqueness and the nature of the harm caused, and that 
deference should be given to the legislative judgment that victim impact 
evidence plays a proper role in sentencing.300  The court agreed, finding 
that any such statement was not likely to be sufficiently overwhelming 
and confusing as to raise cruel and unusual punishment concerns.301  
Thus, the victim’s right prevailed over a defendant’s overly broad 
interpretation of the scope of his rights.302 
                                                 
293 Morehart v. Barton, 250 P.3d 1139, 1140 (Ariz. 2011). 
294 Id. at 1144. 
295 Id. 
296 Id. at 1145. 
297 Id.  
298 State v. Muhamad, 678 A.2d 164, 170 (N.J. 1996). 
299 Id. at 171. 
300 Id. 
301 Id. at 175. 
302 Id. at 182. 
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In another case concerning impact statements, Kenna v. U.S. District 
Court for C.D. California, two defendants plead guilty.303  At the first 
defendant’s sentencing more than sixty victims submitted written 
statements—and several spoke in open court—about the effects of the 
crimes.304  At the second defendant's sentencing hearing, the district 
judge refused to hear the victims speak in person because he claimed 
that he heard them at the other defendant's sentencing and had re-
reviewed all their statements.305  Kenna, one of the victims, petitioned to 
reopen the sentence because he had not been heard, but the Defendant 
argued that a victim’s right to be heard during sentencing was limited to 
written impact statements.306 
The court concluded that "[v]ictims now have an indefeasible right to 
speak, similar to that of the defendant,” which was violated when the 
victim was not allowed to speak at sentencing.307  The district court 
contended that the scope of “[t]he right to be reasonably heard” lay 
within judicial discretion.308  The Court of Appeals, however, interpreted 
the CVRA's right to be “reasonably heard” as the victims' right to speak in 
open court.309  Thus, it would appear, some victims’ rights are sufficiently 
important that, on rare occasion, their vindication may involve an 
impediment to an expeditious trial, but a reasonable extension of the 
sentencing phase after a fair trial. 
                                                 
303 Kenna v. U.S. Dist. Ct. for C.D. Cal., 435 F.3d 1011, 1013 (9th Cir. 2006).  On the other 
hand, the right of allocution exists only for those who may be defined as proximate 
“victims.”   See, e.g., In re Antrobus, 519 F.3d 1123, 1125 (10th Cir. 2008) (determining 
whether plaintiffs’ daughter is a “victim”).  In that case, the accused pleaded guilty to the 
transfer of a handgun to a juvenile, who, after reaching the age of eighteen, shot several 
people at a shopping center.  Id. at 1124.  The parents of one of the shooting victims 
petitioned the court hearing the transfer of the handgun offense to recognize their daughter as 
a victim, enabling the parents of the deceased to be heard at the defendant's sentencing 
hearing following conviction of the transfer of handgun offense.  Id.  The Tenth Circuit 
Court of Appeals ruled that the transfer of a handgun was not directly connected to the death 
of their daughter.  Id. at 1125. 
304 Kenna, 435 F.3d at 1013. 
305 Id. 
306 Id. 
307 Id. at 1016. 
308 Id. at 1013.  This judicial discretion is broad.  See, e.g., Sharp v. State, 908 S.W.2d 752, 
757 (Mo. Ct. App. 1995) (holding that the more narrow language of the victims’ rights 
statute did not bar a victim from testifying as to a specific sentencing recommendation 
because the trial court retained broad discretion under common law to receive any 
information it deemed relevant to the sentencing process). 
309 Kenna, 435 F.3d at 1016. 
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E. The Right to Privacy and “Fair” Treatment 
The victim’s right to privacy was alleged to conflict with a 
defendant’s right to Due Process in, among other cases, State v. Gomez.310  
In Gomez, the victim suffered eye damage after being attacked by the 
defendant and was evaluated by his own doctor, who made a 
diagnosis.311  The trial court ordered that he also be examined non-
invasively by a doctor chosen by the defense before trial would 
proceed.312  The victim appealed, alleging that the order violated his 
right to be “treated with fairness, compassion and respect by the criminal 
justice system.”313  The appellate court held that “a trial court may 
exercise its inherent authority” in this way.314  However, in an effort to 
effectively balance the victim’s right to privacy with the defendant’s 
right to a fair trial, the appellate court ruled that there must first be a 
showing of a compelling need for the examination—that, for example, 
comparable evidence is not available through another source—and that 
the benefit to the defendant “clearly outweighs” the hardship or 
inconvenience to the victim.315 
In a similar situation, also evincing judicial readiness to “fairly” 
balance competing interests, a victim with cerebral palsy and 
developmental delays was molested by her father.316  He was convicted 
of “sexual conduct with a minor.”317  During the sentencing phase, the 
                                                 
310 State v. Gomez, 62 A.3d 933, 935 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2013).  See e.g., Day v. 
Superior Court, 823 P.2d 82, 83–84 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1991) (sustaining the denial of a theft 
defendant's motion for deposition of the victim, based on the Arizona Constitution’s 
Victim's Bill of Rights, which precludes the trial court from ordering the deposition of a 
victim who has indicated an unwillingness to be interviewed by the defense, despite the 
rule of criminal procedure that permits a trial judge to exercise discretion to order the 
deposition of a material witness in certain circumstances); State v. O'Neil, 836 P.2d 393, 
394–95 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1991) (concluding that the lower court’s order for the state to record 
all statements made by the victims to the prosecutor and provide defense counsel with 
copies of the transcripts would enable the defendant to make an end run around the 
constitutional right conferred on victims to refuse any discovery requests by, in essence, 
permitting the defendant to obtain an interview of the victims).  But see State v. Blackmon, 
908 P.2d 10, 12 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1995) (finding that the defendant had the right to cross-
examine the victim at her “victim impact statement” because the Victim's Bill of Rights did 
not abolish the pre-existing rule that the defendant had a due process right to question 
victims who testified at pre-sentence hearings). 
311 Gomez, 62 A.3d at 934–35. 
312 Id. at 935. 
313 Id. at 939. 
314 Id. at 940. 
315 Id. at 939 (emphasis added). 
316 See P.M. v. Gould, 136 P.3d 223, 225, 231 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2006) (demonstrating that the 
trial court has the best opportunity to balance the interests of the parties). 
317 Id. at 225. 
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state informed the court that it intended to call the victim’s counselor as 
a witness to prove the aggravating factor of emotional harm.318  The 
defendant subpoenaed the counseling records to prepare for cross-
examination of the counselor, and the trial court ordered an in camera 
review of the records.319  The victim appealed, seeking to protect her 
privacy by preventing production of those records.320  The appellate 
court held that the defendant had a right to information “essential to the 
preparation of a defense,” and that where the victim's counselor-patient 
privilege is at odds with the defendant's due process right, “the 
defendant's due process right is the ‘superior right.’”321  As suggested in 
Gomez, however, the lower court should first determine whether the 
records were essential to the state’s efforts.  The appellate court found 
that they were not.322  The state already had proof of six aggravating 
factors, yet only one was needed for an “aggravated” sentence.323  
Therefore, the victim’s privacy was preserved without interference with 
defendant’s due process rights or prosecutorial discretion. 
A victim’s right to privacy was alleged to interfere with a 
defendant’s right to appellate review in State v. Bray.324  After his 
conviction for rape and other related offenses, the defendant filed a 
motion seeking to preserve the victim's computer hard drive in the 
record under seal for purposes of appellate review.325  The victim 
claimed that this would violate her statutory right to “refuse . . . [a] 
discovery request by the criminal defendant.”326  The trial court granted 
the defendant's motion, however, and the victim filed an interlocutory 
appeal.327  The appellate court maintained the defendant’s due process 
rights by holding, inter alia, that the order to place the victim's hard drive 
under seal to protect defendant's appellate rights did not constitute 
“compelled discovery” in violation of the victim's right to refuse 
discovery because: 
                                                 
318 Id. 
319 Id. at 225–26. 
320 Id. at 225. 
321 Id. at 226. 
322 Gould, 136 P.3d at 231. 
323 Id. at 230.  Further, even if the trial court found that the state’s interest in calling the 
counselor was compelling, it should have then considered whether the records were really 
necessary for cross-examination.  Id. at 232. 
324 See State v. Bray, 291 P.3d 727, 730 (Or. 2012) (discussing how the victim’s right to 
privacy conflicted with the defendant’s right to appellate review). 
325 Id. 
326 Id. at 733. 
327 Id. at 731. 
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[T]he issue at this stage of the case . . . is not whether 
defendant was entitled to have the cloned hard drive 
produced before or during trial.  The victim has already 
won that point:  The trial court refused to give defendant 
access to the hard drive. . . .  [T]he trial court ordered 
only that the victim deliver an existing hard drive clone 
so that it could be placed under seal in the trial court 
file. . . .  [T]he trial court order does not require the 
disclosure of any information relating to the litigation to 
anyone.  Regardless of what the exact boundaries of 
“discovery” may be . . . defendant’s request . . . for 
purposes of appellate review, and the trial court's order 
allowing that request, [does] not qualify.328 
There is also a decision in which a victim’s right to privacy has been 
alleged to interfere with a defendant’s right to confront witnesses under 
the Sixth Amendment.  A defendant filed a motion in State v. Gilchrist 
“for an order directing the prosecutor to provide the defense with a 
photograph” of the victim to allow him to cross-examine her.329  The 
victim argued that this would violate her right to be “treated with 
fairness, compassion[,] and respect by the criminal justice system.”330  
The court held that the victim did not have to provide the photograph 
because the defendant failed to show how it was relevant to his claim of 
innocence, and that any possible benefit to the defendant was 
outweighed by the victim’s right to privacy, fairness, and respect.331 
F. The Right to be Heard on Appeal 
Exercise of this right, may conflict with prosecutorial discretion 
regarding such decisions.  In State v. Bradley, for example, a victim filed 
criminal complaints against two individuals.332  The prosecutor filed a 
complaint against one, but refused to pursue the other for lack of 
probable cause.333  The victim moved to reverse this decision.334  The 
court found that the victim had no standing to do so because he was not 
a “prosecuting attorney” as required by the appellate court rules.335  The 
victim argued on appeal that New Jersey law does not prevent a private 
                                                 
328 Id. 
329 State v. Gilchrist, 885 A.2d 29, 31 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2005). 
330 Id. at 34–35. 
331 Id. at 35. 
332 State v. Bradley, 19 A.3d 479, 480 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2011). 
333 Id. 
334 Id. 
335 Id. 
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litigant from initiating proceedings by filing complaints and, at that 
stage, there is no need for a “prosecuting attorney.”336  The State 
countered that the sound “public policy behind the limitation on who 
may act as a ‘prosecuting attorney’ is well-established.”337  In addition, 
“[u]nlike private citizens, prosecutors are . . . governed by the Rules of 
Professional Conduct[,] and their decisions are calculated] to ensure 
fairness in the process.”338  The appellate court agreed, ruling that it is a 
matter of prosecutorial discretion as to whether it’s in the public’s 
interest to appeal, and a victim cannot appeal an exercise of prosecutorial 
discretion.339  This is a typical situation in which prosecutors have not 
been “swayed,”—did not deviate from their ethical duty—as a result of a 
victim’s participation in the process. 
In conclusion, given the decisions reviewed in this section—
involving as they do the resolution of actual disputes or conflicts 
between victims seeking enforcement of rights, and assertions of 
defendants’ rights or claims of prosecutorial discretion—it is fair to 
conclude that state courts have no difficulty in fairly and expeditiously 
balancing the interests of all participants in resolving these disputes over 
the extent of victims’ rights.  There is no indication in this precedent that 
efforts to enforce victims’ rights have interfered in any significant way 
with the expeditious and fair administration of criminal justice. 
VII.  ANALYSIS 
The 1970s witnessed a social movement focused on the status of 
crime victims in the criminal justice system.  It was described as “one of 
the most successful civil liberties movements of recent times.”340  The 
“movement” flowed in part from academic studies indicating the 
negative effects of crime on victims and their dissatisfaction with the 
criminal justice system, both of which directly impacted the willingness 
                                                 
336 Id. at 481. 
337 Id. 
338 Bradley, 19 A.3d at 481.  See, e.g., Taliaferro v. Locke, 6 Cal. Rptr. 813, 816 (1960) (noting 
that the prosecutor is bound by the law and professional ethics controlling all counsel).  
These decisions go beyond safety and redress for an individual victim; they involve "the 
complex considerations necessary for the effective and efficient administration of law 
enforcement."  People v. Keenan, 758 P.2d 1081, 1098 (Cal. 1988) (quoting People v. Heskett, 
30 Cal. 3d 841, 860 (1982)). 
339 Bradley, 19 A.3d at 482.  See, e.g., Reed v. Becka, 511 S.E.2d 396, 400 (S.C. Ct. App. 1999) 
(holding that a victim did not have the right to veto a plea agreement and force a 
prosecutor to trial or back into negotiations; the prosecutor has unfettered discretion in this 
regard). 
340 Boland & Butler, supra note 51, at 5 (quoting John W. Gillis & Douglas E. Beloof, The 
Next Step for a Maturing Victims Rights Movement:  Enforcing Crime Victim Rights in the 
Courts, 33 MCGEORGE L. REV. 689, 691 (2002)). 
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of victims to report crimes and cooperate in their prosecution.341  As a 
result, after overwhelming public and legislative support, the Illinois 
Constitution was amended in 1993 to provide a substantial list of 
victims’ rights.342  This was followed by legislation executing that 
constitutional provision.343 
However, the enforcement of victims’ rights in most states, including 
Illinois, was delegated solely to prosecutors, who have often failed—or 
at least are thought by victims to have failed—in their statutory duty of 
enforcement due to inadvertent nonfeasance or, occasionally, 
“erroneous” exercises of prosecutorial discretion.344  Yet, regardless of 
                                                 
341 See Davis, supra note 49 (analyzing the history of the criminal justice system). 
342 See ILL. CONST. art. 1, § 8.1(a) (enumerating the rights for crime victims).  Article I, 
Section 8.1(a) of the Illinois Constitution guarantees crime victims ten basic rights “as 
provided by law”: 
(1) The right to be treated with fairness and respect for their dignity 
and privacy throughout the criminal justice process.  (2) The right to 
notification of court proceedings.  (3) The right to communicate with 
the prosecution.  (4) The right to make a statement to the court at 
sentencing.  (5) The right to information about the conviction, sentence, 
imprisonment, and release of the accused.  (6) The right to timely 
disposition of the case following the arrest of the accused.  (7) The right 
to be reasonably protected from the accused throughout the criminal 
justice process.  (8) The right to be present at the trial and all other 
court proceedings on the same basis as the accused, unless the victim is 
to testify and the court determines that the victim's testimony would 
be materially affected if the victim hears other testimony at the trial.  
(9) The right to have present at all court proceedings, subject to the 
rules of evidence, an advocate or other support person of the victim's 
choice.  (10) The right to restitution. 
Id.  The Illinois Constitution also provides that “[t]he General Assembly may provide by 
law for the enforcement of this section.”  Id.; see Parness et al., supra note 3, at 73–74 (stating 
the House approved a unanimous vote, and the public passed the amendment with a three-
fourths vote). 
343 See supra note 6 (describing the enacted legislation). 
344 See supra note 17 (describing the failure of the prosecutors in fulfilling their duty of 
enforcement); 725 ILL. COMP. STAT. 120/4.5(a)–(b) (2010) (delegating the rights to the state’s 
attorney); see also 725 ILL. COMP. STAT. 120/9 (setting out the scope of the Act).  The Act 
states: 
This Act does not limit any rights or responsibilities otherwise enjoyed 
by or imposed upon victims or witnesses of violent crime, nor does it 
grant any person a cause of action for damages or attorneys fees.  Any 
act of omission or commission by any [person or entity] acting in good 
faith in rendering crime victim's assistance or otherwise enforcing this 
Act shall not impose civil liability upon the individual or entity or his 
or her supervisor or employer.  Nothing in this Act shall create a basis 
for vacating a conviction or a ground for appellate relief in any 
criminal case.  Failure of the crime victim to receive notice as required, 
however, shall not deprive the court of the power to act regarding the 
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whether or not prosecutors conform to their statutory duty, many issues 
will inevitably arise during a criminal prosecution where a victim will 
have important concerns regarding the way her statutory rights have 
been implemented or protected.345  Victims’ interests may or may not 
coincide with those of prosecutors or defendants.346  In these situations, 
victims should at least have standing to request judicial assistance in 
resolving these perceived conflicts. 
The legal justification for allowing victim standing can be found, 
first, through reasonable statutory interpretation of existing victims’ 
rights provisions.347  Second, by analogy to the persuasive jurisprudence 
                                                                                                             
proceeding before it; nor shall any such failure grant the defendant the 
right to seek a continuance. 
Id. 
345 See, e.g., Gina Warren, Due Process—Prosecutorial Implications of a Victim's Right to be 
Heard:  Court Upholds Victim's Right to be Heard at Important Justice Hearings:  State v. Casey, 
44 P.3d 756 (Utah 2002), 34 RUTGERS L.J. 1173, 1184–85 (noting the importance in protecting 
the defendant’s due process and liberty rights). 
346 See, e.g., William T. Pizzi, Victims' Rights:  Rethinking our "Adversary System,” 1999 
UTAH L. REV. 349, 349 (1999) (“The Victims' Rights Amendment carries with it formal 
acknowledgment that victims of violent crime have a stake in the trial that is different from 
that of the general public or even the prosecutor.”).  Even where the interests of the state 
and the victim are consistent in a given case, the legislature should still consider enacting a 
requirement that prosecutors file forms in court files evidencing compliance with their 
statutory duties and verifying that victims’ rights have been noticed or respected.  See, e.g., 
UNIF. TRIAL CT. RULES 31–40 (2010), available at http://courts.oregon.gov/OJD/ 
docs/programs/utcr/2010_UTCR.pdf, archived at http://perma.cc/C4CY-WBRC 
(describing the prosecuting attorney’s notification of compliance with crime victims’ 
constitutional rights for adults and delinquents).  In addition, it might be fruitful to enact 
by legislation proof of notice forms, template pleadings and orders for use in requesting 
and granting victim intervention. 
347 This is the case due to the rules of statutory construction in Illinois.  See supra Part III 
(implying victim standing to assert and vindicate their unenforced rights as a matter of 
statutory interpretation).  For example, the Illinois statute, like others, expressly requires 
that victims have “[t]he right to be treated with fairness and respect for their dignity and 
privacy throughout the criminal justice process.”  725 ILL. COMP. STAT. 120/4(a)(1) (2010).  
In New Jersey, the court found that this same overarching right in its constitution implied 
standing to vindicate denial of other individually expressed rights, at least in the absence of 
interference with the rights of the state or the defendant.  See, e.g., In re the Interest of K.P., 
709 A.2d 315, 320 (N.J. Super. Ct. Ch. Div. 1997) (discussing the legislative intent regarding 
victim’s rights).  The court stated: 
It is difficult for the court to imagine that the Legislature intended to 
give victims these expansive rights, yet specifically intended that they 
should not be a factor for a court to consider when there is compelling 
evidence that a detrimental effect upon a victim will occur if the court 
ignored their request.  The State contends that the Legislature 
specifically identified victims to be considered an interested party with 
standing to open a proceeding, and, therefore, the court should 
determine that the ability to open suggests standing to close.  The court 
agrees.  The court finds that the legislative intent is more in line with 
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in other jurisdictions that have not expressly granted victim standing as a 
matter of law, but where standing has been implied.348  Finally, victim 
standing seems unproblematic given positive judicial experience with 
existing “victim standing” provisions in a significant number of other 
states and under federal law.349  While arguments have been advanced 
about the potential negative impact of victim intervention—or, more 
accurately, victim “participation”—on both defendants’ constitutional 
rights and prosecutorial discretion, most of these arguments flow from a 
misguided sense of the effect of “victim standing” provisions.350  There 
had been a misperception that these provisions would create an 
additional “party” in criminal proceedings, one capable of impeding the 
criminal process by making it more complex or time-consuming, or of 
interfering with defendants’ constitutional rights. 
In fact, victims’ standing to vindicate or protect their own rights—or 
at least their conception of those rights—has been shown in practice to be 
closely limited to that purpose, and there is generally no significant 
interference with or impediment to prosecutorial discretion or the 
defendant’s due process rights.351  The victim’s standing is often based 
on the implied or expressed purposes of victims’ rights laws and 
practically all potential conflicts over assertions of these rights—either in 
those states with or without victim standing as a matter of positive law—
and has been rationally and expeditiously resolved by criminal trial 
courts.352  There is no reason to believe this will not also be the case in 
Illinois. 
Consequently, legislative and political efforts were made to amend 
the Illinois Constitution specifically to provide crime victims with 
                                                                                                             
considering the victim’s position as opposed to ignoring it.  The court 
finds a victim is a constructive equivalent to a party in the case. 
Id.  The same reasoning would support a similar interpretation of the victims’ rights laws of 
Illinois. 
348 See supra Part V (interpreting the implied standing in states without express victim 
standing provisions). 
349 See supra Part V (discussing the complication with the defendants’ right to a speedy 
trial and victims contesting violations of their rights). 
350 See supra notes 5, 17–21 and accompanying text (analyzing the arguments over victim 
intervention).  It should also be noted that the important principle of prosecutorial 
discretion should not be extended to include discretion regarding a statutory duty to 
enforce a victim’s statutory rights, especially where a victim continues to be vulnerable to 
further violence.  See Kathryn E. Litchman, Punishing the Protectors:  The Illinois Domestic 
Violence Act Remedy for Victims of Domestic Violence Against Police Misconduct, 38 LOY. U. 
CHI. L.J. 765, 772–74 (2007) (noting that the recidivism rate of domestic abuse is particularly 
high but quantifying the prevalence is difficult). 
351 See supra Parts V–VI (contrasting between states that allow and disallow victim 
standing provisions). 
352 See supra Part IV (providing the jurisprudence on victim standing). 
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standing to participate in criminal prosecutions for the limited purpose 
of protecting their statutory rights.353  Fortunately, although passage of 
such a constitutional amendatory act was thwarted in the last Illinois 
legislative session, the legislature was committed to enacting victim 
standing.354  The amendatory bill was again introduced in March of 2014, 
and passed as a joint resolution on May 30, 2014.355  It seeks to allow 
crime victims to be participants in the process, rather than merely to 
have a voice in the criminal proceedings.356  This action was thought 
necessary, of course, because state courts generally hold that victims, not 
being “parties” to criminal prosecutions, do not automatically have 
standing to intervene to challenge denied rights or interests.357  Yet, 
inevitably, there continue to be perceived conflicts between the asserted 
scopes of statutory rights asserted by victims and exercises of 
prosecutorial discretion or demands for protection of a defendant’s due 
process rights. 
Separate causes of action for injunctive relief under these 
circumstances, a legislatively suggested alternative, would be an 
inefficient and ineffective remedy for violations of crime victims’ rights.  
                                                 
353 See, e.g., Amendment, supra note 7 (describing the house resolution proposing an 
amendment to the Illinois Constitution to give more rights to crime victims). 
354 See supra notes 17–21 and accompanying text (raising concerns about offering victims 
a role in the traditional two-party criminal justice process); Weinhold, supra note 1, at 1.  
The pending amendment would, inter alia, add the following section to the original 
constitutional list of rights:  “(b) A victim, the victim's lawyer, or the prosecuting attorney 
may assert the rights enumerated in subsection (a) in any court with jurisdiction over the 
case as a matter of right.  The court shall act promptly on the request.”  Amendment, supra 
note 7 (emphasis added); see also Illinois Victims’ Rights Amendment Stalls after Sudden 
Turnaround in Legislative Support, supra note 8 (noting that the committee killed the bill 
before the deadline). 
355 See H.R.J. Res. No. 103, 98th Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Ill. 2014), available at 
http://www.ilga.gov/legislation/BillStatus.asp?DocNum=103&GAID=12&DocTypeID=H
JR&LegId=82477&SessionID=85&GA=98, archived at http://perma.cc/WP2D-QX24 
(describing that the bill was adopted by both houses on May 30, 2014). 
356 See Boland & Butler, supra note 51, at 9 (addressing the victim’s role in the criminal 
justice process). 
357 See, e.g., Dix v. Superior Court, 807 P.2d 1063, 1067 (Cal. 1991) (holding that crime 
victims do not have the right to appeal the sentence imposed); Cooper v. District Court, 133 
P.3d 692, 696 (Alaska Ct. App. 2006) (rejecting various arguments that victim had standing 
to seek appellate review of sentencing error and her right to have part of a sentencing 
hearing sealed); Lamb v. Kontgias, 901 A.2d 860, 869 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 2006) (holding 
victim was not party to criminal prosecution and did not have standing to appeal lack of 
notice and opportunity to speak at hearing to reconsider sentence); In re State ex rel. 
Sistrunk, 142 S.W.3d 497, 502 (Tex. Ct. App. 2004) (holding victim's family had no standing 
to challenge defendant's sentence or procedures at sentencing hearing); Commonwealth v. 
Malloy, 450 A.2d 689, 694 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1982) (holding that the criminal victim was not a 
party to the criminal prosecution and did not have standing to appeal the decision 
dismissing complaint). 
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This is, no doubt, why few, if any, independent or separate actions of 
this sort have been filed since the effective date of the victims’ rights 
provisions in Illinois.  The most effective remedy for denied victims’ 
rights—and for resolving such conflicts—is direct, limited victim 
participation.  That is, crime victims, when necessary, should be able to 
assert their statutory rights by moving directly and immediately for 
specific relief as part of and during the criminal prosecution.  It would be 
odd to conclude that victims should in any way be denied this ability to 
seek such relief in this most efficient and effective manner.  The courts, 
after all, have the power to prevent a miscarriage of justice, they are the 
guardian of rights, and thus requests for standing to obtain relief are “in 
pari materia with the fundamental right [victims’ constitutional right in 
most states,] to be treated with fairness, compassion, and respect by the 
criminal justice system.”358 
Those latter phrases have been held to make a victim a constructive 
equivalent to a party in the case, and may seem to modify the traditional 
state-defendant paradigm, but they “participate” only for the limited 
purposes of vindicating victims’ statutory rights.359  To administer 
criminal justice otherwise would change victims’ constitutional and 
statutory rights into a nullity.360  Thus, it was quite appropriate for the 
Illinois voters to ratify the recent constitutional amendatory bill granting 
victims standing for the purpose of enforcing their rights. 
VIII.  CONCLUSION 
Illinois courts are already free to use their inherent equitable power 
to enforce the rights of victims by allowing victims standing to directly 
petition for vindication of denied rights during prosecutions.  In the 
alternative—perhaps because the judiciary has been reluctant to make 
such implications in the absence of legislative support, and because 
                                                 
358 In re Interest of K.P., 709 A.2d 315, 321 (N.J. Super. Ct. Ch. Div. 1997). 
359 See 725 ILL. COMP. STAT. 120/4.5(b)(9) (2010) (implicating the requirements of the 
prosecutor).  The statute provides that the prosecutor: 
[S]hall inform the victim of the right to have present at all court 
proceedings, subject to the rules of evidence, an advocate or other 
support person of the victim's choice, and the right to retain an attorney, 
at the victim's own expense, who, upon written notice filed with the 
clerk of the court and State's Attorney, is to receive copies of all 
notices, motions and court orders filed thereafter in the case, in the 
same manner as if the victim were a named party in the case[.] 
Id. (emphasis added). 
360 See id (enumerating the victims’ constitutional rights).  Specifically, if the New Jersey 
Constitution cannot be construed to grant standing to victims then the constitutional 
amendment lacks meaning:  “the people of New Jersey amended their constitution to grant 
the Legislature power it already possessed.”  In re Interest of K.P., 709 A.2d at 324. 
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authority in other states supports the efficacy of such an amendment—
the Illinois voters wisely ratified a constitutional “victims’ standing 
amendment” accomplishing the same goal as judicial implication.  The 
legislature has indicated its inclination to do so in the past, and, given 
the continuing dissatisfaction on the part of crime victims with the extent 
of their current participation in the criminal process, it was wise to 
finally enact and have ratified such an amendment.361  The Illinois 
judiciary, as has been shown through precedent in other states with 
victim standing, should be more than capable of guarding against any 
possible “impediments” to defendant’s rights or prosecutorial discretion.  
Further, given the ongoing possibility of prosecutorial nonfeasance—
especially given expanding caseloads—independent victim standing is 
necessary to guarantee victims’ rights.362  The Illinois legislature and 
voters exercised good judgment in passing the Victims’ Standing 
Constitutional Amendment. 
                                                 
361 See supra notes 40–62 with accompanying text (describing the dissatisfaction of the 
crime victims). 
362 See supra notes 17–21, 42 with accompanying text (describing the crime victims’ 
participation in the criminal process). 
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